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While the law of competition may be sometimes 
hard for the individual, it is best for the 
race, because it insures the survival of the 
fittest in every department. 
Andrew Carnegie (Wrightsman, 1973, p. 97) 
The law of life should not be competition of 
acquisitiveness, but cooperation, the good of 
each contributing to the good of all. 
Jawaharlal Nehru (Wrightsman, 1973, p. 97) 
In many everyday situations individuals are faced with 
the choice of cooperating or competing. Depending on the 
situation and the participants, some people will choose to 
cooperate, and some will choose to compete. For example, 
observe two people headed for the same seat in a crowded 
football stadium. Does one yield while the other pushes 
ahead? The motives behind such a choice are not observable 
and must be inferred from the individual's behavior, but a 
preference for one way of behaving can be established for 
any given individual if subjected to systematic observation. 
Most psychologists would agree that the rudiments for 
such a preferred way of behaving develops from motives that 
are learned in child,hood. As a child becomes socialized, 
s/he develops characteristic motives. 
1 
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This socialization process normally does not get under-
way until the child overcomes egocentrism and develops an 
awareness of the existence of other persons. Maudry and 
Nekula (1939) have shown that children of 25 months were 
more attracted to a toy than to another child, but after 
this age the infants began responding to the existence or 
activity of another playmate. Rudimentary forms of coopera-
tive play and of mutual aid in the solution of problems 
requiring collaborative efforts first appear in older pre-
school children between the ages of four and six 
(Gottschaldt and Fruharif-Ziegler, 1958; Hirota, 1951; 
Meister, 195~; Wolfe and Wolfe, 1939; and Zak, 1968). 
Though appearing at a somewhat earlier age, studies of com-
petitive behavior also indicate that children characteris-
tically do not compete with others prior to these years 
(Greenberg, 1932; Kagan and Madsen, 1971, 1972; Leuba, 19~3; 
McClintock and Nuttin, 1969; McKee and Leader, 1955; and 
Parten, 1932-33). However, both behaviors and types of 
play--cooperative and competitive--increase dramatically 
after this age period, particularly during the elemen~ary 
school years (Alvy, 1968; Azrin and Lindsley, 1956; 
Baldwin, 1955; Fry, 1967; Graves, 1937; and Vinacke and 
Gullickson, 1964). 
Robert J. Havighurst (1972) suggests that of these two 
kinds of behavior, learning to cooperate with age-mates is 
the primary developmental task of these middle-childhood 
years between the ages of six and twelve. He describes the 
J 
nature of this task in terms of learning the give-and-take 
of social life among peers; that is, learning how to make 
friends anq get along with enemies. Increasing numbers of 
psychologists, anthropologists, and sociologists seem to 
agree with Havighurst and the importance he places on this 
developm~,ntal task--getting along with others. In today's 
modern world it seems to be a far more essential skill for 
coping successfully than learning how to make it on your own. 
i 
The technological and overpopulated state of our world 
appears to be bringing a rapid end to the Andrew Carnegie 
days of the "self-made man". Few people can survive eco-
nomically today in an isolated, extended family, agrarian 
I 
setting, or even a small town, nuclear family, entrepreneur 
setting. Out of economic necessity more and more people 
have been forced to abandon the "American Dream" and face 
the realities of life together in the cities and their 
factories 9 shopping centers, and freeways. I Arthur Toffler 1 s 
"future shock" (1970) is here and we have yet to consider 
the necessary social changes man must make if s/he is to 
survive as a speciess 
Our schools are still teaching our children during 
those critical middle childhood years that competing rather 
than cooperating is the means for survival. Being better 
than everyone else is still valued more than a successful 
group effort. Our schools transmit this societal value in 
numerous ways, a few of which include our comparative grading 
practices, our homogeneous ability grouping practices, our 
employment of individualistic reward structures rather than 
promotive interdependent struct~res (De~tsch, 1949), and 
the competitive atmospheres fostered in most of our physical 
education and athletic programs. All these and many more 
popular t~aching methods communicate to our children that 
one 0 s self-worth is determined by how one performs in com-
parison to one's peers. Erikson (1963) would suggest that 
it is competitive arenas, such as these in our schools, 
which cause many children to develop senses of inferiority 
and inadequacy in their strivings for a sense of competency 
and industry in their social world. 
Even our female children, who have traditionally been 
socialized to become cooperative and altruistic individuals, 
seem to be receiving a more competition-oriented socializa-
tion today. This_reversed social conditioning for females 
is ai~ed at improving their lot and eliminating women's 
feelings of incompetency and fears of success. The libera-
' 
tion movement's eventual goal is to provide social and eco-
nomic equality between the sexes a~d put an end to 
discrimination by sex. Though the goals of this movement 
are admirable indeed, the parad~x lies in the means by which 
proponents of it appear to be trying to acbdeve their ends. 
These means include giving young women in our society more 
of the same outmoded, maladaptive competitive and rivalrous 
training and preparation that our young men have been sub-
jected to for centuries. An assumption with the reasoning 
value of the proverbial saying "What is good for the goose 
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is good for the gander!" seems to have been made here. 
There is no evidence to suggest that an evaluation of the 
appropriateness or applicability of this type of socializa-
tion for our young people has any validity for success, 
adjustment, and survival in the tomorrows of the future. 
The perpetuation of this societal value for competition 
via new, impetutous social trends such as this, and old, 
traditional teaching practices and priorities as those men-
tioned previously 9 seems to need more careful consideration 
and scrutiny. Jonas Salk, a biologist and author of a book 
' 
insightfully entitle, The Survival of the Wisest, seems to 
have aptly summarized the situation: 11 A complete inversion 
of values is necessary if man is to move from the Darwinian 
era to the epoch of cooperation; the alternative is species 
suicide" (Phi Delta Kappan, 1975, p. 667). 
The social, economic, and ecological needs of our 
times clearly indicate that sound reasoning and foresight 
would be demonstrated if more of our time, energies, and 
monies were spent on trying to understand and promote the 
conditions which foster cooperation amongst people and deter 
competition. Since it appears that these motives and sub-
sequent behaviors begin at an early age, then it would seem 
logical that both our investigation and intervention efforts 
are concentrated on populations of young children. In a 
review of the research on cooperation and competition as 
early as 1957, Phillips and DeVault noted this need: 
The developmental and antecedent aspects of coopera-
tion and competition have not been sufficiently 
investigated ••• (although) the studies which are 
available suggest such factors may be important in 
understanding cooperation and competition (pp. 291-
292)s 
6 
In a more recent review of the literature in this area (Cook 
and Stingle, 1974), the authors found that in the past sev-
eral years there has been an increased interest in studying 
cooperative behavior though they add that this kind of 
research is still at a minimal level. They also concur with 
this author's position that in a world with today 1 s social 
and political problems, it seems reasonable to devote 
extensive effort to the investigation of cooperative behav-
ior. With these factors in mind, the present investigation 
into the antecedents and conditions for the development of 
cooperative behavior was undertaken. 
Statement of the Problem 
As McClintock and Nuttin (1967) note, one of the major 
problems in studying coperative behavior in children is 
finding reliable and valid measures of such behavior. Most 
of the adult research on cooperative behavior has employed 
the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (Galls and McClintock, 1965), 
a dyadic or two person, forced~choice game. Recently, 
Tedeschi 9 Hiester, and Gahagan (1969) have developed a modi-
fied version of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game for use with 
preadolescent populations. Unfortuantely, studies using 
modifications of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game suitable for 
children have produced conflicting results suggesting that 
such games are not appropriate for measuring cooperative 
behavior in children (Lindskold, Cullen, Gahagan and 
Tedeschil 1970; Tedeschi, Hiester, and Gahagan, 1969). 
Other studies of children 9·s cooperative behavior have 
been carried out using measuring procedures developed by 
Madsen and his colleagues (Kagan and Madsen, 1971, 1972a, 
1972b; Madsen, 1967• 1971; Madsen and Shapira, 1970; Nelson 
and Madsen, 1969; Shapira and Madsen, 1969, 197~). These 
procedures, which include the Cooperation Boardl Circle 
Matrix Board, and Marble-Pull Game, are similar to the 
Prisoner's Dilemma Game in that they are dyadic and forced-
choice in nature. Although use of these measuring tech-
7 
niques has revealed some.interesting cross-cultural, and 
subcultural differences, they have also produced a large 
number of discrepant results suggesting that these games may 
not be the best measures of cooperative behavior in children 
(Kagan and Madsen~ 1971; Nelson and Madsen, 1969; Spiro, 
1965; McKee and Leader? 1955; and Szal, 1972). 
It is this author's belief that conflicting results 
have been produced by studies utilizing modifications of the 
Pritsoner v s Dilemma Game, or one. of the games of Madsen 
et al., because these games are not very representative of 
real-life situations involving cooperation and competition. 
First, they are designed to allow interaction between only 
two persons. In the real world individuals have the freedom 
to choose between interacting or not interacting with any 
'·~ 
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number of different people. Second, these games allow for 
' 
no communication, or only minimal communicatiqn, between 
players, a restriction non-existent in the real world. 
Third, these games are forced-choice in nature; that is, 
the players are forced to choose between cooperating or 
· .. ,competing~ In the real world 7 this either-or restriction 
does not exist and people are free to both cooperate and 
compete as much as they want. Engaging in cooperative behav-
ior does not preclude engaging in competitive behavior and 
vice versao These criticism make questionable the value of 
the data that have been produced by studies using dyadic, 
forced~choice measuring devices. 
To avoid these problems this study employed a negoti-
able essential game, called Sticks and Chips, which is a 
game in which it is necessary to be a member of a winning 
coaliation in order to bargain for any of the payoff. 
Although negotiable essential games have been used exten-
sively to study adult coalition formation (Bond and Vinacke, 
19~1; Caplow, 1956; Mills, 1953, 1954; Shears, 1966; 
Vinacke 7 1959; Vinacke and Arkoff, 1957), such games have 
only been used in a few studies of cooperative behavior in 
children (Shears, 1967; Shears and Behrens, 1968, 1969; 
Vinacke and Gullickson, 1964)~ The negotiable essential 
game used in this study, that is, Sticks and Chips, was 
developed by Loyda M. Shears (1967). 
The advantages of using Sticks and Chips over the more 
popular dyadic, forced-choice games are as follows: ( 1) it 
9 
allows for small group interactions~ (2) it involves a lot 
of verbal and nonverbal communication amongst.players, and 
(J) it allows players to cooperate and compete independently 
of each other. The Sticks and Chips game simulates the real 
world social interactions involving cooperative and competi-
' 
tive behavior to a much greater extent than modifications 
of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game or similar dyadic games. It 
was felt that by employing Sticks and Chips in this study, 
two things would be accomplished: (1) useful information 
concerning children's cooperative behavior would be obtained 
and (2) the construct validity of the Sticks and Chips game 
would be further extended. To accomplish these ends the 
Sticks and Chips game was employed to investigate three 
specific problems concerning children's cooperative behavior: 
(1) the relationship between age and cooperation, (2) the 
relationship between group sex composition and cooperation~ 
and (J) the relationship between power and cooperation. 
Reviews of the literature on the relationship between 
age and cooperative behavior have come to conflicting con-
elusions. On the one hand Cook and Stingle (1974 1 p. 922) 
concluded that "both cooperative behavior and campetitive 
behavior have been found to increase with age" and, on the 
other~ Wrightsman.(1973, p. 107) stated that "in compari7on 
with 14- to 16-year-olds children from ages 7 to 8 bargain 
less actively, establish unnecessary alliances more fre-
quently 9 and make more cooperative efforts to achieve mutual 
satisfaction." The reason for this contradiction may lie in 
10 
the kinds of studies examined by the two reviews. Cook and 
Stingle primarily reviewed observational studies and studies 
employing dyadic, forced-choice ~ames like the Prisoner's 
Dilemma Game, while Wrightsman reviewed studies employing 
negotiable essential games. Although the present study did 
not propose to resolve this controversy 9 it did attempt to 
find out whether the negative relationship between age and 
cooperative behavior, previously found when negotiable 
essential games were used (Shears and Behrens 9 1969; 
Vinacke and Gullickson 9 1964), could be replicated. Further-
more9 to gain additional information on the relationship· 
between age and cooperative behavior 9 the range of ages 
investigated in this study was extended downward from that 
examined in previous studies5 The first hypothesis of this 
study was that younger children would demonstrate signifi-
cantly more cooperative behavior when engaged in a mixed-
motive game than older children. 
The second problem that was investigated in this study 
was the relationship between group sex composition and 
cooperation. Literature reviews of cooperative behavior in 
children by both Cook and Stingle (1974) and Maccoby and 
Jacklin (1974) have concluded that surprisingly few studies 
of cooperative behavior in children have looked at sex dif~ 
ferences. Cook and Stingle (1974) speculate that the 
absence of data nn this variable may be due to the fact that 
"the samples were too small to perform reasonable separate 
analyses (which was frequently the case), because no 
11 
differences emerged 7 or because this variable w•s not of 
primary interest" ( 1974 7 pp. 922-923). The few s'tudies 
which do examine this variable with populations of young 
children have not shown conclusively that sex is a variable 
influencing cooperative behavior. However, a trend support-
ing the popularist notion that females are more cooperative 
and males are more competitive is observable (Maccoby and 
Jacklin 7 1974). These results have been found both by 
studies employing dyadic, forced-choice and negotiable 
essential games. 
In light of the scarcity of studi~s examining the 
effect of the sex variable on cooperative behavior, it is 
not surprising to discover that only one previous study 
could be found that examined the effects of sex composition 
of groups on cooperative behavior and this study involved 
adults (Bond and Vinacke, 1961)e In view of what has been 
observed about children's changing preferences with regards 
to sex of peer associates during the middle school years 
(Elkind, 1971) 7 examining the effect of group sex composition 
on cooperation would seem to be appropriate. This task was 
undertaken in the present study. Specifically, this study 
sought to find out whether the homogeneous or heterogeneous 
sexual makeup of children's groups has any effect on coopera-
tive behaviorm Since there was some evidence to suggest 
that females are more cooperati~e than males, it was pre-
dicted that all female or predominantly female groups would 
be more cooperative than subjects in all male, predominantly 
male, or equal sex groups. The second hypothesis of this 
study was that both the all female and female majority sex 
composition groups would demonstrate significantly more 
cooperative behavior than the equal sex, all male,, or male 
majority sex composition groups. 
The third problem that was investigated in this study 
was the relationship between power and cooperation. 
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Although the effect of power on cooperation has been exten-
sively studied with adult subjects (Bond and Vinacke, 1961; 
Caplow, 1956; Mills, 1953, 1954; Shears, 1966; Tedeschi, 
Lindskold, Horai, and Gahagan, 1969; and Vinacke and 
Ankoff, 1975), it has received little attention with chil-
dren (Cook and Stingle, 1974). The few studies which have 
examined the effect of power on the cooperative beh~vior of 
children found a negative relationship between the two vari-
ables~ In general, as power increased cooperative behavior 
decreased (Shears and Behrens, 1968, 1969; Vinacke and 
Gullickson, 1964)~ The expectation was that the present 
study would replicate these results. The third hypothesis 
of this study was that player~ holding the high power posi-
tion would demonstrate fewer cooperative behaviors than 
players holding either the moderate or low power positions. 
Interestingly enough the same few studies (Shears and 
Behrens, 1968, 1969; Vinacke and Gullickson, 1964) which 
examined the effect of power on cooperation within children?s 
groups also found that there appears to be an age by power 
interaction. That is, with age children become less 
lJ 
.. 
cooperative when they possess a high power status within the 
group. This finding is understandable from the stanqpoint 
that older children probably place more importance on the 
value of winning and have a better understan~ing of the 
effect of power in this society to accomplish that end than 
younger children$ In an effort to further establish this 
.1. 
minimally validated rationale·~ it was predicted that power 
would decrease cooperative behavior amongst older children 
J 
to a greater degree than it would decrease cooperative behav-
ior amongst younger children. The fourth hypothesis of this 
study was that_the high power position would decrease cooper-
ative behavior amongst fourth graders to a greater degree 
than it would amongst first graders$ 
Theoretical Approach 
In terms of reaching an understanding of the develop-
ment of cooperative motives and behavior based on some 
existing theoretical framework 1 the best approach appears 
to be to combine a number of explanations 1 for no one theory 
adequately describes its development. This is largely due 
to the fact that no one has attempted to write a theory 
specifically dealing with cooperation. This behavior is 
usually explained by extrapolating from more general and 
broader psych~logical' frames of reference$ 
In view of this state of the theoretical information 
ava~lable on cooperation 1 it was necessary to use parts of 
both the cognitive-theorists and the social-learning 
14 
theorists explanations of human behavior to reach any 
logical understanding of c~operative behavior. The 
cognitive-theorists seem to offer the best explanation as to 
why cooperative behavior is not observable in children until 
the later preschool years (Gottschaldt and Fruharif-Ziegler, 
1958; Hirota~ 1951; Maundry and Nekula 1 1939; Meister 1 1956; 
Wolfe and Wofe 1 1939; andZak 1 1968)~ and why competitive 
behavior is observable at somewhat earlier ages and remains 
more characteristic of children until at least the beginning 
of elementary school and the middle childhood years 
(Greenberg~ 1932; Kagan and Madsen~ 1971 9 1972; Leuba, 1933; 
McClintock and Nuttin 9 1969; McKee and Leader 9 1955; and 
Parten, 1932~33)0 Their explanation for this phenomena is 
in terms of cognitive growth and maturational propencities. 
That is 9 they suggest that prior to these later preschool 
years, and sometimes not until as late as the elementary 
years 1 children are basically egocentric in their thinking 
and behavior0 Initially infants and young toddlers have 
little awareness of the existence of others or their rela-
tionships to themselves; they are described as lacking object 
permanence (Phillips, 1974). Once object permanence is 
obtained children move into a stage of cognitive development 
in which they begin to understand their relationship to 
others and the effects they can have on their environment, 
but they are still unable to comprehend that what they are 
thinking or feeling may not be what someone else is thinking 
or feeling0 Their thinking 1 and likewise their behavior, is 
15 
very egocentric and prelogical in nature (Phillips, 197~). 
One of the most significant developmental psychologists 
of our times 9 Jean Piaget 9 put forth a theory of cognitive 
development in which he describes in great detail the changes 
which take place in childrenVs thought processes from birth 
through adolescence and the effect these cognitive abilities 
and limitations have on their behavior (Piaget, 1928, 1952a, 
1952b 9 and 1972)~ His theory has received wide recognition 
and has been empirically tested and supported by numerous 
followers of his beliefs (Inhelder and Piaget, 1958; 
Laurendeau and Pinard, 1962; Saltz 9 1971; and Snedslund, 
1961)@ 
What is important about Piaget's theory and other cogni-
tive explanations to our understanding of cooperation is 
that their position suggests that child~en are not cogni-
tively capable of making a true cooperative response until 
they have overcome these early maturational limitations and 
passed through what Piaget called the "heteronomous" stage 
of cognitive and moral development (Piaget 9 .1932). In his 
book 9 The Moral Judgment of the Child 9 Piaget presents a 
two-stage theory of moral development which is based on his 
observations of the way cognitive factors effect the moral 
reasoning and judgments of children given a series of paired 
short stories calling for .a moral1judgment about the actions 
of the characters in these stories~ On the basis of age 
differences in the responses to these stories, Piaget con-
cluded that it is not until the second stage of moral 
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development 9 the "autonomous" stage, which he estimat.es that 
most children do not enter until around eight years of age, 
that children are capable of mutual respect and genuine 
cooperation with one another (Ausubel and Sullivan, 1970). 
He would suggest that any act~ which appears cooperative in 
nature and occurs during the ''heteronomous" state, was 
probably imposed on the child by parents or served some 
hedonic funrtion (Kay~ 1968)~ Havighurst (1972) uses several 
references to Piaget and his theory of moral development to 
support his contention that middle childhood is the crucial 
period for learning the morality of cooperation, and thus, 
the most important developmental task during the elementary 
school years. Havighurst suggests that it is through social 
interactions with his peers that the child: 
• o • learns that rules are necessary and useful to 
the conduct of any social enterprise, from games 
to government~ and thus learns a 'morality of 
cooperation or agreement' which is true moral 
autonomy and necessary in a modern democratic 
society ••• (1972, p. 28). 
Another well-known cognitive theorist, Lawrence 
Kohlberg~ became interested in this area of moral development 
and after twelve years of very systematic examination of 
peoples¥ judgments to moral dilemma stories has proposed his 
own stage theory of moral development (Kohlberg, 196Ja, 
196Jb, 1969, and 1971). His elaborate six stage theory 
suggests that Piaget's two-stage theory might be too simplis-
tic to explain all the factors behind peoples 1 moral reason-
ing and decisions. Though he probably would agree with 
Piaget 1 s characterization of the earliest stage of moral 
17 
development (what Kohlberg calls the "preconventional" 
level), he would not agree with the rudimentary way Piaget 
explained all moral reasoning and behavior after that stage. 
Kohlberg (196Ja~ 196Jb, and 1971) suggests that after the 
egocentric and hedonic phase of cognitive and moral growth, 
the individual moves into a "conventional" level of morality 
in which his thinking and behavior is based on what society 
dictates as being right or wrong, good or bad. He divides 
this conventional level into two separate, and yet highly 
similar oriented stages 9 which he calls the "good-boy, 
good-gi;rl" stage and the "law and order" stageQ 
Here is where an understanding of both Kohlberg 9 s and 
Piaget 9 s theories would suggest that they would differ in 
J 
their expla~ation of why children choose to cooperate or 
compete. Whereas Piaget 1 s theory implies that now that the 
child is capable of a genuine cooperative act s/he will 
I 
begin to make decisions based on reciprocity and equity 
(Kay 9 1968)~ Kohlberg 1 s theory suggests that such a change 
is not as automatic and will not necessarily follow. Instead 
a child of conventional morality will be more likely to 
formulate moral judgments based on whatever the majority and 
the rules say is right or wrong 9 or on whatever will 
receive social approvalo Therefo~e, Kohlberg would suggest 
that children functioning at this level of moral development 
will behave in whatever manner is necessary to obtain 
recognition and reinforcem~nt from authority figures and 
their peer groups. ·At this level what is right becomes 
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"what everybody else would do," or "what the teacher or the 
law says is right." Since research has shown that most 
elementary-aged children function at this conventional level 
of morality (Kohlberg, 196Ja)~ the decisi~n to behave coop-
eratively once the ability is acquired becomes largely a 
i 
matter as to whether or not such an act is rewarded, gains 
approval, or is the norm. 
On the basis of these theoretical assumptions, it is 
not difficult to see how children at this stage of develop-
ment could be easily influenced by models--both adult and 
peer--in their environment. Social-learning theorists sug-
gest that in their efforts to seek apprqval from significant 
others, children will imitate the social behaviors of both 
adult and peer models whether or not there is any direct 
reward or reinforcement for such imitative behavior 
(Bandura, 1969). These theorists claim that many social 
behaviors--aggression, fear, disobediencef altruism--are 
learned merely through observation of a potent model and 
that if a behavior is observed being rewarded it will more 
than likely be imitated (Bandura and Walters, 196J). To 
illustrate how pertinent modelling behavior can be towards 
our understanding of cooperation, studies by Hartup and 
Coates (1967) should be carefully considered. In their 
study of four- and five-year-old children, they demonstrated 
that the mere observation of an altruistic peer model (a 
confederate child who gave away his trinkets) significantly 
increased the altruistic behavior of their subjects. In 
19 
another study of altruistic behavior (1964a, 1964b), these 
same social-learning theorists showed that children are more 
willing to copy and imitate popular children; that is, those 
peers that are generous with praise and approval and also 
get a good deal of it themselves. It seems reasonable to 
assume that the same learning principles operate in the 
acquisition of cooperative behaviore Thus, it is evident 
that whether a child cooperates or competes is greatly 
determined by which type of behavior is more valued by his 
adult and peer models. Since competitive behavior is 
modeled and rewarded more frequently in our society than 
cooperative behavior, as children are socialized they become 
more and more competitive. 
In summary, it was on the basis of such theoretical 
positions about the nature of human development and the 
observation of the predominance of competition over and 
above cooperation in our society (Wrightsman, 1973, p. 107), 
that the predictions for this study on the development of 
cooperation were made$ 
Value of Study 
The immediate value of this study lies in the fact that 
it will provide valuable information concerning some of the 
variables which effect cooperation in children, as well as 
construct validation data concerning the measure of coopera-
tive behavior, Sticks and Chips~ This study will provide 
information concerning the effects of age, group sex 
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·composition 7 and.:power on cooperative behavior. In so 
doing, it will serve the function of further establishing 
the developmental sequence of cooperation which previous 
studies have noted a need for. Of these variables, no pre-
vious research has been carried out on group sex composition 
and, thus, this information will be especially valuable. 
The long range value of this study lies in the applica-
tion of the information it will provide. As n.oted in the 
introduction, cooperative behavior appears to be more 
adaptive in our current world than competitive behavior. 
Thus 9 all of the information available on cooperative behav-
ior could be used to facilitate such behavior. If it is 
shown that older children are less cooperative than younger 
children, the socialization processes responsible for this 
trend could be examined and modified so that children do not 
become less cooperative as they grow older. If it is shown 
that all female and female majority groups are more coopera-
tive than equal sex 9 male majority, or all male groups, it 
might be beneficial for the male socialization process to be 
modified to conform more closely to the female socialization 
process~ Thus, making it possible for both male and female 
children to exhibit high levels of cooperative behavior 
without fearing failure or, in the case of males, a loss of 
masculinity. Finally, if it is shown that differential 
power decreases cooperative behavior, steps might be taken 
to decrease power differentials amongst children (and adults, 
for that matter) and, thus, facilitate more cooperative 
behavior. 
Limitations 
The scope of this study was limited in several ways. 
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One of these limitations was the fact that only one subject 
population was used--students from one of the elementary 
schools in Stillwater, Oklahoma. Whether the results ob-
tained with this p6pulation are generalizable to other 
populations, cultures, or even subcultures, within the 
United States is not known. Another limitation is that only 
a female experimenter was used. This may have inflated 
overall cooperative behavior or may have had differential 
effects on cooperative behavior for male and female subjects. 
A third limitation of this study was that only two age 
levels, first graders and fourth graders, were used. A more 
complete picture of developmental trends would have been 
obtained if older and younger age groups had also been used. 
A fourth limitation was that only a single measure of cooper-
ative behavior, Sticks and Chips, was used. As noted 
earlier, different measures of cooperative behavior seem to 
produce different results, especially with respect to the 
age vari~bleo It would be interesting to include several 
measures of cooperative behavior within a single study to 
find out the extent to which the various measures produced 
similar results. Unfortunately, the scope of this s~~dy was 
not large enough to permit the accomplishment of this end. 
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One of the greatest limitations of this study, however, 
was that it looked only at cooperative behavior and not also 
at competitive behavior. One of the advantages of using the 
Sticks and Chips game over the Prisoner's Dilemma Game and 
other forced-choice games is that it does not force subjects 
to choose between cooperating and competing. Subjects play-
ing Sticks and chips can both cooperate and compete at the 
same time. Thus, it is possible that research utilizing 
Sticks and Chips could show that both cooperation and 
competition increase or decrease with age or that one 
increases and the other decreases. Unfortunately, this one 
question was not tested in the present investigation and will 
have to await examination through future research. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
For convenience and organization this review of the 
literature will be presented in terms of the four hypotheses 
being tested in this study. The first section of this 
review will deal with studies which have looked at the rela-
tionship between age or grade and cooperative behavior. The 
second part of this review will present the research which 
has dealt with sex composition of group and cooperative 
behavior in children. The third and final section will deal 
with the literature on power position an~ cooperative behav-
ior and those studies which have looked and/or found inter-
actions between grade and power with respect to cooperative 
behavior. 
Grade (Age) and Cooperative Behavior 
This section presents the literature relevant to the 
first hypothesis that first-graders would demonstrate sig-
nificantly more cooperative behavior when engaged in a 
negotiable essential m~xed-motive game than fourth-graders. 
As noted in Chapter I of this dissertation, the relationship 
~ J 
found b~tween age and cooperative behavior seems to depend 
on the procedure used to measure cooperative behavior. Thus 9 
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this part of the literature review will be presented in 
terms of the three measurement procedures used most fre-
quently to measure cooperative behavior in children: 
observation; dyadic, forced-choice games (e.g., modifica-
tions of the Prisoner's Dilemma game); and negotiable 
essential~ mixed motive gamse such as the Sticks and Chips 
game. 
Observation Studies 
Studies using observation as the method for measuring 
cooperative behavior have generally found that cooperative 
behavior increases with age though there seems to be a great 
~ ... 
deal of disagreement concerning th~ age when "true" coopera-
tive behavior first appears. One of the earliest studies 
utilizing observation was carried out by Parten (1932) who 
studied cooperative behavior in preschool children. Parten 
found that cooperative behavior did not occur until late in 
the preschool years an?- that it was preceded by solitary 
play, looking on~ parall~l play, and associated play. A 
replication of this study by Barnes (1971) found t~e same 
sequence in pr~schoolers with one significant qualification 
~~the preschoolers of today are less sociable in«their play 
than those of forty years ago. These results suggest that 
our society has become more competitive and less cooperative 
over the past forty years. Studies by Wolfe and Wolfe 
(1939) and Gottschaldt and Fruharif-Ziegler (1958) have also 
found that rudimen~ary forms of cooperative play and mutual 
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aid in the solution of problems first appear in older pre-
school children. 
Other observational studies, however, have found that 
cooperative behavior does not arise until later; that is, 
during the early elementary school years (ages six and 
seven) after which time it gradually increases with age 
(Alvy, 1968; Fry, 1967; Hirota~ 1951; Zak, 1968). Finally, 
Meister (1959)~ usi~g a very stringent definition of cooper-
ative behavior in which it was equated with egalitarian 
activity, found that cooperative behavior among American 
children did not arise until the twelfth year or later. 
In summary, although observational studies are not in 
agreement concerning the age at which cooperative behavior 
arises~ they all agree that the relationsh~p is a positive 
one; that is, as age increases so does cooperative behavior. 
Studies Using Dyadic, Forced-Choice 
Games 
Contrary to studies employi~g observation, in general 
though not always, studies using dyadic~ forced-choice 
games to measure cooperative behavior have found that 
cooperative behavior decreases with age. Before these 
studies are reviewed, it should be recalled that dyadic, 
·' 
forced-choice games are probably not the best measures of 
cooperative behavior. As noted in Chapter I, such games 
force subjects to choose between cooperating and competi~g 1 
involve only two people, and allow for only a minimum amount 
-·' 
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of communication. Furthermore, Vinac~e (1969) even ques-
tions whether the "cooperative choice" in such games really 
stems from cooperative motives. He suggests three reasons, 
other than the desire to cooperate, for choosing the 
"cooperative choice'': (1) the player could be trying to 
maximize his own gain by manipulating the other players into 
making a certain choice, (2) the player could actually be 
competing against the experimenter, and (3) the player could 
be wanting to defect but no such alternative response is 
available to him. Keeping these criticisms in mind, the 
literature concerning age and cooperative behavior as 
defined by dyadic, forced-choice games will be reviewed. 
Madsen and his associates using the dyadic, forced-
choice games such as the Cooperation Board, the Circle 
Matrix Board, and the marble-pull task to measure coopera-
tive behavior have found that the ~ooperative behavior of 
American children decreases with age. Kagan and Madsen 
(1971) found that American four- and five-year-olds were 
less "irrationally competitive" than seven-, eight.,.., and 
nine-year-olds. In another study, this one cross cu~tural 
in nature, Madsen (1971) again compared four- and five-year-
olds with seven- 1 eight-, and nine-year-olds. He found 
that Anglo-American children but not Mexican children became 
more "non-adaptively competitive" with age. Kagan and 
Madsen (1972b) studied rivalry and found that older children 
(eight- to ten-year-olds) engaged in significantly more 
rivalrous behavior than younger children (five- and 
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six-year-olds) in a choice task with the difference across 
a,ge being the greatest in the American, not the Mexican, 
children. Consistent with these results, McClintock and 
Nuttin (1969) found that when American and Belgian children 
from three grade levels (second, fourth, and sixth) engaged 
in a maximizing difference game~ the young American children 
made more competitive choices than the young Belgians, but 
that by the sixth grade both were equally competitive. The 
results of these studies all show that American children 
become more competitive and less cooperative with age. How-
ever~ these results also show that this trend is not univer-
sal; that is, that culture is extremely important in 
determining t~e relationship between age and cooperative 
behavior~ at least when cooperative behavior is measured by 
dyadic 9 for~ed-choice games. 
Not all of the studies employing dyadic, forced-choice 
games to measure cooperative behavior have found that such 
behavior decreases with age. A study by Sampson and Kardush 
(1965) employing a modification of the Prisoner's Dilemma 
game found that older pairs of boys were more collaborative 
than younger pairs. 
In summary, most of the studies which have employed 
dyadic, forced-choice measures of cooperative behavior to 
look at the relationship between age and cooperation have 
found that American children become less cooperative with 
ageo One study exists, however, which found opposite 
resultss Furthermore, this negative relationship between 
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ag'e and cooperation has not been found in Mexican children. 
Studies Employing Negotiable Essential, 
Mixed-Motive Games 
Both of the studies which have employed negotiable 
essential, mixed-motive games to measure cooperative behav-
ior have found that cooperation decreases with age$ A study 
by Vinacke and Gullickson (1964) found that with age boys 
become increasingly more exploitative and less cooperative. 
Another study by Shears and Behrens (1969) which looked at 
the cooperative behavior of third and fourth grade boys .and 
girls found that subjects moved away from accommodative 
toward expoitative behavior between these two ages. 
In general, observational studies have found that 
cooperati-on increases with age while studies employing 
games, both dyadic, forced-choice and negotiable essential, 
mixed-motive games, have found that cooperation decreases 
with age. It may be that these conflicting results have 
been found because children are taught cooperation with 
respect to everyday social interactions and competition with 
respect to game playing. 
Sex Composition of Group and 
Cooperative Behavior 
In this section, the literature will be reviewed which 
is relevant to the second hypothesis that the all female and 
female majority sex composition groups would demonstrate 
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significantly more cooperative behavior than equal sex, all 
male, or male majority sex composition groups. The effects 
of group sex composition on cooperative behavior has been 
looked at in only one study. This study which was conducted 
by Bond and Vinacke (1961) was carried out with adult sub-
jects, not children. In introducing their study, Bond and 
Vinacke point out the importance of research on group sex 
composition: 
In the experimental study of small groups little 
attention has been paid to the problem of differ-
ences between groups homogeneous and heterogeneous 
with respect to sex. A typical procedure, in 
fact 9 is to control for the effect of sex, as by 
constituting groups all of the same sex. Neverthe-
less, not only are mixed-sex groups just as natural 
in their occurrence as any other combination of 
persons 9 but these are ample grounds for supposing 
that mixed-sex groups\will act differently from 
same-sex groups (p. 61). 
Elsewherej Bond and Vinacke suggest that research looking at 
the effects of mixed-sex groups on cooperative behavior is 
especially valuable because it provides an oppo~tunity to 
study the interaction~ of majority and minority segments of 
·' 
such groupss Although the rationale put forth by Bond and 
Vinacke for studying group sex composition had research with 
adult subjects in mind 9 the rationale seems equally appli-
cable to studies involving children. 
In carrying out their study, Bond and Vinacke found 
that sex composition of group actually did have an effect on 
cooperative behavior. The general playing style of the male 
majority in comparison to the female majority was found to 
be significantly m~re exploitative. Consequently 9 the 
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accommodative strategies (bargainin~ and allying) of the 
female participants resulted in better final outcomes for 
them than the male participants. The males in this study, 
whether in the majority or minority, seemed to be concerned 
with maximizing_their own.immediate gains even though in the 
long run this strategy was self-defeating. 
The results of the Bond and Vinacke (1961) study sug-
gests that the effects of group sex composition can probably 
be reduced to or explained in terms of sex differences in 
cooperative behavio~. In other words, female majority 
' 
groups are more cooperative than male majority groups 
because women are more cooperative than men 1 not because 
something unique occurs when men and women are grouped to-
gether in different majority and miriority configurations. 
With this in mind 1 it seems reasonable to review studies on 
sex differences in cooperative behavior i~ children in order 
to obtain an u~derstanding of the effects of group sex 
composition on the cooperat~ve behavior of children. The 
remainder of this part of the review will be devoted to such 
studies. 
In general, studies which have looked at sex differences 
in cooperative behavior in children have found that girls 
are more cooperative than boys, though several studies have 
" 
found ,no differences and one found that boys were more co-
operative than girls. Spiro (1965) observing children one 
to five years of age in an Israeli Kibbutz found that girls 
were more integrative (giving, helping, sharing~ affectionate 9 
J1 
cooperative, etc.) than boys. McKee and Leader (1955), 
using a block construction game with middle and lower class 
same-sex pairs of boys and girls~ found that the boy pairs 
wer~ more competitive and less cooperative than the girl 
pairs. Tedeschi, Hiester~ and Gahagan (1969) .used a modi-
fied version of the Prisoner's Dilemma game to investigate 
cooperative behavior in third and fourth grade girls and 
boys. They found that male dyads more frequently made 
double competitive choices than did female dyads~ On the 
other hand 9 female dyads had more unilateral cooperative 
outcomes over trials 9 displayed more trust, and were more 
forgiving than male dyads. 
In_~ontrast to the studies presented above, Harford 
and Cutter (1966) 9 carried out a study which involve a sim-
ple cooperative choice task (selecting the same color of 
poker chip as onev s partner) and found no significant 
sex differences for white children, six to twelve years of 
However, for black children of similar ages, Harford 
and Cutter found that boys made significantly fewer coopera-
tive moves than girlss Other studies which have failed to 
find sex difference in cooperative behavior include those of 
Nelson and Madsen ( 1969); Wasik~ Senn, 'and Epanchin ( 1969) 7 
Brotsky and Thomas (1967)7 and Kagan and Madsen (1971)~ 
Another exception is a study by Lindskold, Cullen, Gahagan, 
and Tedeschi (1970)9 Using a modification of the Prisonervs 
Dilemma game in an effort to replicate the previous findings 
of Tedeschi et al. (1969), these researchers found that 
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fifth and sixth grade boys were more cooperative than fifth 
and sixth grade girls. These researchers attempted to 
explain the contradictory nature of their results by the 
field dependent nature of this age population and the fact 
that a female experimenter was used. (The study by Tedeschi 
et al8 (1969), which found that girls were more cooperative 
than boys employed a male·experimenter.) 
A few studies which have looked at sex differences in 
cooperative behavior have found that sex and age interact to 
effect cooperation. These studies have generally found that 
sex differences are exaggerated with age; that is, young 
girls are more cooperative than yoUng boys and that for 
older children this difference is even greater. One study 
was carried out by Sampson and Kardush (1965). Using a non-
zero sum game, these investigators found that with age the 
females in their study became more conservative in their 
willingness to take risks while the reverse was found for 
males; that is 9 with age females mad.e more cooperative 
choices while males made fewer cooperative choices. Simi-
larly, Vinacke and Gullickson (1964) found a sex by age 
interaction. These experimenters looked at sex differences 
in cooperative behavior over a wide range of ages (seven-
and eight-year-olds~ twelve- through fourteen-year-olds, 
and college students) and found that females of all ages 
tended to be accommodative in th~ir behavior while males 
became increasingly more exploitative and less cooperative 
with age. Shears and Behrens (1969) 9 using the negotiable 
JJ 
essential 7 mixed-motive game 7 Sticks and Chips~ found a sim-
ilar age by sex interaction in their third and fourth grade, 
mixed-sex tetrad (four person) groups. The female subjects 
in this study maintained a highly cooperative playing style 
across the two grades while male subjects showed a shift 
from cooperative playing (third grade) to co~petitive 
playing (fourth grade). A final study which found an age by 
sex interaction is one carried by Kagan and Madsen (1972b). 
These researchers studied the cooperative behavior of male 
and female, . same-sex pairs of Anglo-American and Mexican 
children, ages seven through nine and found that for Anglo-
American children, boys became increasingly rivalrous with 
age whil,e girls did not. However, this age by sex interac~ 
tion was not found for the rural Mexican children. 
In summary, the results of this part of the literature 
review support the conclusion of Maccoby and Jacklin (19?4) 
that there is a trend in the direction that supports the 
popularist view that males are the more competitive sex. In 
addition, this review found that sex differences in coopera-
tive behavior become exaggerated with age. The fact that 
sex differences in cooperative behavi6r become exaggerated 
with age for American children and that this interaction is 
not found in all cultures suggests that sex differences in 
cooperative behavior are probably a product of sex role 
socialization. Little boys are taught that they must com-
pete and little girls are\taught that they must cooperate 
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and with age children master these differences more and more 
successfully. 
Power and Cooperative Behavior 
The last section of this literature review will deal 
with studies which are related to the third and fourth 
hypotheses of the present investigation. The third hypothe-
sis states that subjects holding the high power position (4) 
• will demonstrate fewer cooperative behaviors than 
players holding either the moderate (2) or low (1) power 
positions. The fourth hypothesis predicts a power by age 
interaction in the direction of a significantly greater 
decrease in cooperative behavior amongst fourth graders 
holding the high power position (4) than amongst first 
graders. Since the number of previous studies looking at 
the effects of power on children's cooperative behavior is 
minimal the review for these two related hypotheses will be 
combined a 
Cook and Stingle (1974), in their review of the research 
on cooperative behavior in children, note that "a variety of 
other subject variables have shown significant. relation to 
cooperation and competition in adults, but very few have 
been studied in children" (p. 928). and suggest that one of 
these subject variables is power. A host of studies 
utilizing negotiable essential, triad games with adults have 
demonstrated that players in these games al~y in terms of 
their initial perception of relative strengths (Bond and 
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Vinacke, 1961; Caplow, 1956; Mills, 1953; 1954; Shears, 
1966; Vinacke, 1959, 1961; Vinacke and Arkoff, 1957). Both 
Caplow (1956) and Vinacke (1969) have proposed elaborate 
game theories to explain the results of this kind of 
researcho Adult studies utilizing other game techniques, 
such as the Prisoner's Dilemma with asymmetrical matrices, 
have also shown that power effects the playing behavior of 
game participants (Galls and McClintock, 1965; Tedeschi, 
Lindskold, Horai, and Gahagan, 1969; Wrightsman, 0 9 Connor, 
and Baker, 1972)~ However, only a few studies have examined 
the effects of power on children's game behavior. 
One study which has looked at the effects of power on 
childr~n 9 s game behavior was carried out by Vinacke and 
Gullickson (1964). These investigators looked at the 
effects of three different power patterns, all equal 
\1 
(1-1-1), all different (4-3-2) 9 and all powerful (3-1-1) on 
the coalition~formafion strategies of three different ~ge 
groups-~seven- and eight-year-olds 1 fourteen- to sixteen-
year~olds 9 and college age subjects~ They found that seven-
and eight-year~old males, though not females, preferr~d 
~ 
"weak" alliances (a coalition involving the two weakest mem-
bers a9ainst the strongest) in the all powerful but not the 
all different condition. For fourteen- to sixteen-year-old 
males and females this preference was also found. However, 
for college students this pattern was reversed in that weak 
alliances were preferred in the all different but not the 
all p'owerful condition. They concluded that males' playing 
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str~tegies become increasingly more exp],oitative wi.th age 
while females 1 strategies remain accommodative. Although 
Vinacke and Gullickson (1964) did look at the effects of 
differential power patterns on coalition formation, strate-
gies (accommodative or exploitative, alliance preferences) 
they did not look at the effects of power on cooperative 
behavior. 
" 
The only two studies which have looked at the effects 
o~ power on children's cooperative behaviors have been car~ 
ried out by Shears and Behrens (1968? 1969)~ To investigate 
the effects of power these researchers used the negotiable 
essential 9 tetrad game~ Sticks and Chips, a game which in-
volves four power positions--a high power (4) position;. 
two moderate power ,(2) positions 9 and a low power (1) 
positione The pattern of power weights in this game closely 
approximates the all powerful pattern (4-J-2) used in triad 
' 
game research. However~ in this experimental game these 
weights are rotated amongst the players an equal number of 
times within a given game to determine what effect a change 
in power will have on each subject's cooperative behavior. 
The object of Sticks and Chips is to form a power 
coalition that is stronger than any other individual or 
coalition (e.g. 9 a coalition of powers four and two is 
stronger than the coalition of powers one and two; the 
coalition of powers two 9 two, and one is greater than the 
four power 1 etc.). Following coalition formation 9 players 
in the winning alliance decide how to divide 20 poker chips 
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which they have won and then another round is played~ 
randomly shifting power positions among players. This con-
tinues until eight rounds have been completed and every 
player has held each power position twice. Cooperation was 
measured in terms of payoff demand; the higher the payoff 
demand, the less cooperative the behavior. Using this game, 
Shears and Behrens (1968) found that, in general, when 
third grade players held the high (4) power position, they 
were less cooperative than when they held the moderate or 
low power positions. Furthermore 9 this uncooperativeness 
was exaggerated for player~, having moderate or high, as 
opposed to low 9 I.Qas~ In another study, Shears and Behrens 
(1969) used Sticks and Chips to look at the effects of power 
on the cooperative behavior of third and fourth grade boys 
and girls. They found that power and age interacted, such 
that when third grad~ players he~d the high power position 
they were less cooperative than when they held one of the 
moderate or low power positions and this effect became sig-
nificantly more predominant for the fourth graders. These 
researchers concluded that "tqese results strongly suggest 
; 
that there is a developmental shift in social perception at 
about age 10'1 (Shears and Behrens, 1969). They also noted a 
need for further research to establish the developmental 
sequence of cooperative-competitive behavior in children of 
other agesa 
In summary 9 although a number of adult studies have 
looked at the effects of power on cooperative behavior~ only 
38 
two children's studies have looked at this topic. These 
-studies found that power decreases cooperation and that this 
relationship becomes exaggerated with age. Since the pres-
ent investigation employed the same tetrad game, Sticks and 
Chips~ as the two children°s studies that looked at power 
I. 
and cooperation (though cooperative behavior was measured 
in a slightly different manner), similar results were 
expectede That is 9 high power players were expected to be 
less cooperative than moderate or low power players 
(hypothesis three) and this difference was expected to 
increase with age (hypothesis four). It should be noted 
that Sticks and Chips easily allows for the study of the 
effects of power on cooperative behavior, something which 
dyadic games, like the Prisonervs Dilemma 9 do not do. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Description of Sample 
The subjects for this study were obtained from one of 
the five neighborhood elementary schools of a public school 
system located in Stillwater, Oklahoma. This community is 
situated in Payne County, a rural area in the north central 
part of the state. It is the home of Oklahoma State Univer-
sity, the second largest state institution for higher learn-
ing in Oklahoma~ According to the 1973-74 Chamber of 
Commerce Census, the total population of Stillwater, 
excludingthe 18,560 students residing there and enrolled at 
the University, is approximately 33,900. 
It is predominantly a middle-class socio-economic 
community. Most of Stillwater's residents make their live-
lihoods as farmers~ factory workers, or employees for the 
University. It is a heavily religious community with 
Protestantism being the majority's reported religious affil~ 
liation. The racial and ethnic composition of this commun-
ity is largely white, Anglo-Saxon but also includes 
representative numbers of two minority groups, American 
Negroes and Indians~ 
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The total enrollment of this community's public school 
.system during the year (1973-74) in which the present study 
was undertaken was 14,610 students. This figure represented 
all the students from five elementary schools (grades 
kindergarten- fifth), one middle school (grades sixth-
eighth), and one junior-senior high school (grades ninth~ 
twelfth)o At that time approximately 200 teachers and other 
student personnel workers were employed for the entire 
school system. 
Forty children 9 20 first-graders (6-7 year olds) and 20 
fourth-graders ( 9-10 year ·:olds) were randomly selected from 
I 
the total first (77 children in all) and fourth (76 children 
in all) grade populations of one of the five neighborhood 
elementary schoolso A random numbers table was used to aid 
in this selection until an equal number of boys and girls 
from each grade was acquiredo The enrollment at this par-
ticular elementary school was 4J4 students which represented 
21 percent of the total number of elementary school children. 
This school is located in one of the middle to upper-middle 
class neighborhoods in the city. 
The names of 10 male and 10 female subjects were then 
placed separately into a bowl and drawn at randor,p :for 
assignment to one of the sex composition treatment groups. 
These groups included the following treatment levels: all 
male 9 all female, equal sex, male majority, or fe~ale 
majority. Each grade~sex composition group consisted of 
four subjects (a tetrad) resulting in a total of five, 
first-grade tetrads and five, fourth-grade tetrads, or ten 
experimental groups in all. 
Procedure 
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Each group of subjects was individually called out of 
their respective classrooms and given the identical cover-
sto~y. They were told that they had been selected from 
their classmates to try out a new children's game for a 
national toy m~nufacturing company. It was then explained 
to them that four representatives from the company were 
present in the building and would be observing and taking 
notes as they played the game~ They were told this was to 
make sure that there were no defects in the game before it 
was put on the market. (This story was given in an effort 
to minimize any distraction which might be caused by the 
presence of four judges.) 
The subjects were assured t4at if they agreed to par-
ticipate in testing out this new game that it would take 
only a few minutes of their time and that their teacher had 
already given permission for them to be excused from class 
for that time period. None of the subjects refused to par-, 
ticipate~ though sickness or absence necessitated replacing 
some of the originally selected subjects with subjects from 
a randomly selected "back-up list". 
One at a time~ each tetrad group was then escorted by 
the experimenter to the video-tape studio in their building. 
There, the subjects were asked to form a circle on the 
42 
carpeted floor by selecting one of the marked seating posi-
tions. These positions were carefully arranged and marked 
by ~s on the floor prior to the actual experi111ent. This was 
done in order to insure an unobstructed view of each player 
for both the judge and the camera which was in an adjacent 
room and was used to tape the proceedings through a one-way 
mirror for purposes of later determining interjudge 
reliability~ 
The judge~ included three females and one male, gradu-
ate students from Oklahoma State University. They were each 
assigned to one of the four seating positions (labelled A~ 
B~ C 9 or D) and given the responsibility to record the 
responses of everY. subject who took that seat throughout the 
duration of the experiment$ Their chairs were situated out-
~ide the children's circle and across from the seating posi-
tion to which they were assignede This provided an optimum 
observational view of each subject's behavior and interac~ 
tions duri~g the course o~ each game8 
Once the children were seated and had become adjusted 
to their surroundings, the experimenter t9ok a seat on the 
floor directly between the children's circle and the judges' 
This position provided her easy access to the game 
materials and optimal eye contact with each of-±he players 
without blocking the view or reach of any one player from 
any other player. At this point the experimenter brought 
out the materials for the game~ introduced the gamei and 
delivered the playing instructions. After the in~tructions 
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were completed the experimenter asked for and addressed any 
clarification questions· from the players. Once the game was 
in progress~ the function of the experimenter became that of 
score keeper~ distributor, and collector of the game mate-
rialse Any additional request for information, guidance, or 
feedback from the experimenter once the game began were 
handled in a very non-directive manner. 
When each group completed.the game and the winner or 
winners were established, subjects were thanked by the exper-
imenter for participating and asked for any criticism about 
the game which might be helpful to the company. No tangible 
reward was offered for winning, a contingency found not to 
effect the basic character of playing strategy (Vinacke, 
1962). The groups were each escorted back t·o their respec-
tive classrooms and before being dismissed instructed not to 
discuss the game with the other.children in their class until 
such time that everyone who had been selected by the cempany 
to try out this new game had had his turn. 
This procedure was repeated in its entirety ten times 
during the course of one school day 9 until all ten experi-
mental groups had been run. The experimenter then visited 
each of the classrooms from which ~ubjects had been drawn 
and delivered a short debriefing explanation and thanked 
them once more for their cooperation. 
Instrument 
The prim~ry measuring instrument for this investigation 
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was a modified version of an experim:ental game referred to 
by the name of "Sticks and Chips" (Shears, 1967; Shears and 
Behrens, 1968, 1969). It is a children's adaptation of an 
adult, negotiable, essential game which has been extensively 
utilized in previous research int6 the behavior of individ~ 
uals in small groups, particularly the study of coalition 
formations (Bond and Vinacke, 1961; Caplow, 1956; Mills, 
1954, 1956; Vinacke, 1959; Vinacke and Gullickson, 1964). 
According to the description offered by Shears and Behrens 
(1968) 1 a negotiable 1 essential games is as follows: 
' 
A negotiable game is one in which actual division 
of the prize or payoff is determined by bargaining 
among the players themselves. In an essential game. 
a player must be a member of the winning alliance 
or coalition to share in the prize. The amount of 
bargaining power each player has is determined by 
the arbitrary assignment of power weights (p. 514). 
In "Sticks ,and Chips" the differing power or status 
positions are represented by sticks of varying lengths. 
These sticks were constructed in such a way that they could 
be connected~ or "pegged" together at either end, to make 
one long stick. The pattern of weights (1-2-2-4) in this 
experiment was represented by four sticks of the following 
lengths: J inches, 4 inches, 4 inches, and 10 inches. Each 
player of this four-person game was assured possession of 
eac.h of the weight positions an equal number of times 
(twice) during a series of eight trials or rounds of play. 
The object of the game as it was piesented to the 
children is to form a coalition to build a stick longer than 
any remaining possible combinations; that is, 11 to make the 
lo!J.gest stick possible." Thus, winning combinations in this 
ga,~e could.include (1) any pair containing the 11 411 power 
' 
weight, (2) an alliance of the three low weights ( 11 1", "2", 
a~d "2" ) , ( J) any other triple alliance (" 1 11 , "2" , and "411 ) , 
(4) a coalition of all four players to join togethe~. If 
no coalition is formed, the rules of the game allowthe rrqti 
po~er weight player to ·win by default. 
petitive player who has been assigned t~e 11 411 could use the 
strategy of "holding out" during the round of play hoping 
for a victory by default to maximize his own gain.) l\ll.Y 
player may propose an alliance and accept or reject the 
offers made to him. Each round of play ends when'negotia-
tions cease and the members of a winning combination con-
sistently adhere to the alliance (Shears and Behrens, 1968). 
The 20 poker chips are then awarded to the winning coalition 
(or the "411 winner) to be distributed in any way agreeable 
to its members. There is no obviously appropriate division 
of chips dictated by the game situation (Shears and Behrens, 
1968). In the present investigation the chips symbolized 
points to the players and the experimenter recorded the 
score of each player at the end of each round of play. 
These scores were totaled at the conclusion of the game, or 
after eight rounds of play. (See Appendix A.) 
Several minor modifications of this game as it was 
designed and used by Shears (1967) were made for the purpose 
of the present study. Because an effort was being made to 
obtain observations and recordings of children's natural 
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preferred game behavior, no encouragement for competition or 
striving to beat other players was offered, nor were any 
tangible rewards available as in the previous studies 
(Shears~ 1967; Shears and Behrens, 1968, 1969). The game 
instructions were presented in as neutral terms a~ possible, 
so as to minimize as much as possible any influencing effect 
on'the children's motivation or behavior in either a competi-
tive or a cooperative direction. An effort to minimize the 
effects of cognitive or comprehension differenc-es amongst 
the subjects was also attempted by demonstratipg every pos-
sible stick combinatiQn as part of the instructional proce-
dure. The specific game and demonstration instructions for 
this study were as follows: 
.You are about to play a new game called 1 Sticks and 
Chips.' I have just handed you your stick for this 
round of the game. Altogether there will be eight 
rounds of play to this game and before each round of 
piaw I will give you a different length stick to 
play with. 
The object of this game is to make the longest stick 
possible. You may keep the stick you are given at 
the beginning of each round or_you may join your 
stick together with the stick or sticks of any ,()f 
the other players to make the longest stick possible. 
Here are some of the ways that these sticks may be 
joined together to make the longest stick possible. 
(The experimenter t:l;len,_demonstrated all of the pos-
sible stick combinations~ including an example of 
default.) · 
The 20 chips I have just placed in the middle of the 
circle go to the player or players who end up with 
the longest stick combination. One person may win 
all the chips by ,default 9 or there may be two or 
three winners for any one roqnd of play, or all four 
players may w~n if you should all decide to join 
together. If there is more than one winner, th~n 
those players will decide how to d~vide up the 20 
ch;ips. -When you h~ve decided amongst yourselves 
how you,3lre going to do it, place the longest stick 
here in the center of your circle so I will know 
th~t you have agreed and are finished. 
After the chips are passed out I will write down on 
this score sheet the number of chips or points you 
win for each round of the game. At the end of eight 
rounds of play the game will be over and I will then 
add up everybody's score and we will see how many 
chips each_,_.of you won during the game. 
Are there any questions? You may begin the game 
now and remember when you have finished making the 
longest stick possible place it in the center of · 
your circle and then pass out the chips to the 
winners. Ready? Begin. 
Besides delivering these instructions and keeping all 
the players' scores 1 the experimenter also collected and 
redistributed the sticks at the beginning of each new round 
of play. This was necessary in order to make sure that 
every player possessed each of the power positions an equal 
number of times (twice) during the course of the game. 
Other than this one limitation the sticks were distributed 
in a random manner so that negotiations associated with a 
given trial would not be cont~minated by a player's ability 
to predict future power distributions. 
The most important modification made on this instrument 
for the purposes of this study was in its scoring. In pre-
vious studies (Shears~ 1967; Shears and Behrens, 1968, 1969) 
payoff demands, that is, .the amolJ.nt of the prize a player 
would find acceptable for his collaboration in an alliance 
or coalition, were measured. A mean acceptable score based 
on payoff amounts which a subject proposed for himself or 
accepted when proposed by another player was computed for 
each subject at each round of the game and then analyzed. 
The negotiation process in these studies consisted not only 
of players' offers to ally but also included the proposed 
payoff division for each nominated player and the answers 
given by these invited members of the coalition. The pre-
vious stpdies using negotiable~ essential games were pri-
marily interested in the effects of power on a player's 
strategy during the game •. These studies hypothesized and 
found that players ally in terms of their initial perception 
of their relative strengths in the situation! that is, they 
play either accommodatively or exploitatively depending upon 
their relative status (1-2-2,-4) for each round (Caplpw, 
1956; Shears and Behrens~ 1968~ 1969; Vinacke and Arkoff, 
19,57; Vin,acke and Gullickson, _1964). These researchers also 
found that payoff demands were significantly effected by the 
players' age~ their sex, and their I.Q. 9 s. 
In this study cooperative behavior was measured. 
Cooperative behavior was operationally defined as the mean 
·' 
number of collaborative negotiations made by a player in 
each round of playQ A collaborative negotiation included 
both a playerVs initiated and/or accepted proposal to ally, 
or "join together~" with the other players. Although the 
payoff division (the distribution of chips at the end of 
each round by the members of the winning coalition) was 
recorded~ it was not the primary variable under investiga-
tion. No special instructions for making payoff division 
proposals during the negotiation process of the game were 
administered as in previous studies utilizing this particular 
game (Shears, 1967; Shears and Behrens, 1968, 1969)& The 
payoff division aspect of the Sticks and Chips game was 
employed in this study only as a means of providing a game 
incentive and a way of accumulating game points (chips) and 
designating winners. 
Since cooperative behavior was the only dependent vari-
able under investigation in this study, no measurement of 
c~mpetitive or exploitative behavior was madee Thus, all 
attempts to collaborate, whether accepted or rejected by 
another player, were considered scoreable responses for the 
purposes of this experiment while any refusal to negotiate 
or rejection of an offer to ally was not scoreable. 
Validity 
Since the procedure that was employed in this study.to 
score Sticks and Chips was unique to this study, previous 
data concerning the validity of this measuring instrument do 
not exist. Even so, a good case can be made for the face 
validity of this instrument. First of all, for the purposes 
of this study cooperative behavior was defined as any group 
oriented activity in which the individual collaborates with 
another or others ta attain some common goal (Ausubel and 
Sullivan, 1970). Counting proposed and accepted offers to 
:form a coalition conforms much more closely to this defini--
tion of cooperation than counting proposed and accepted pay-
Counting proposed and accepted offers to form a 
coalition gets at collaborative activity while counting 
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proposed and accepted payoffs seems to get at how effective 
an individual is in bargaining. Secondly~ the present modi-· 
fication of Sticks anlChips simulates real world opportuni-
ties to cooperate more closely than the more popular measure 
of coop,erative behavior, the-Prisoner's Dilemma Game. The 
Prisoner 9 s Dilemma Game i's limited ti:f -only two people while 
Sticks and Chips is not. Furthermore~ Sticks and Chips 
allows for verbal-and ;nonverbal communication before 
deciding whether or not to cooperate while the Prisoner 9 s 
Dilemma Game does not. 
The confirmation of several of the hypo.theses proposed 
in this study~provides some firm evidence for the face 
validity of this modified. version of Sticks and Chips. 
Further research employing this version, however, is needed 
before any conclusions concerning its construct validity 
can be made. 
Reliability 
The reliability of this instrument and its modified 
scoring procedure was determined by a three-step procedure. 
The first step was to pilot test the game, its instructions 
and materials 9 and the "Collaborative Negotiations Recording 
Sheet'' (see Appendix B). This was done one afternoon with 
the assistance of one of the judges and four experimental 
groups of young children randomly selected from a diff~rent 
elementary school than the one from which the actual sample 
was later drawn. This pilot resulted in some major 
improvements in both the wording of the game instructions 
and the form of the recording sheet. 
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The second step entailed the training of the judges, 
four graduate students from the. educational psychology pro-
gram at Oklahoma State University), in the use of the 
Collaborative Negotiations Recording Sheet (see Appendix B). 
This was done in two separate training sessions. The first 
was approximately two hours in length and was largely 
didactic in natures The judges were briefed on the purpose 
of the research 9 given a description and demonstration of 
the experimental game 9 and given detailed descriptions of 
both the verbal and nonverbal behaviors that were to be 
recorded. During a second session which lasted approximately 
45 minutes the judges were given the opportunity 1to practice 
the observational and recording_procedures in a trail run 
with actual subjects •. 
The third step which took place during a post-
experimental session involved having the original four 
judges view video tapes of the experiment. During this 
session they were instructed to record the responses of a 
single subject 9 the subject occupying seating position A of 
each of the experimental groups. The recordings of each 
judge for that subject were then correlated using Scott~s 
formula (Flanders 9 1966) with the recording of every other 
judge. The average correlation for this interjudge reliabil-
ity was computed to be .85 with the coefficients ranging 
from .6571 to a964. This degree of interjudge reliability 
was deemed to be sufficient for this study. 
Design 
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A 2 x 5 x 3 factorial analysis design, with one repeated 
measures (power)~ was employed in this study. The non-
repeated independent variables were: (1) two levels of the 
grade/age variable--first graders (si~ and seven year olds) 
and fourth graders (nine and ten year olds); and (2) five 
levels of group sex composition-~equal sex (EqS), male 
majo~ity (MM), female majority (FM), all male (AM), and all 
female (AF). Ten tetrad (four persons) groups,, five first 
grade and five fourth grade groups~ were analy~ed for their 
between-subject variance. Forty subjects in all also 
receive.d the within-subject treatment for three levels of 
power,--low power (weight 1), moderate power (weight 2), and 
high power (weight 4). Each of these power weights was 
assigned to every subject two times during a series of eight 
rounds of play in the game Sticks and Chips. 
Cooperative behavior, the dependent variable, was meas-
ured as the mean number of collaborative negotiations, both 





The results of j:his experi~ent were analyzed by means 
of a 2 :X 5 x 3 split-plot analysis of. variance with·' the last . 
factor being the within-subjects variable (Kirk, 1968). The 
between-subjects, independent variables consisted of grade 
( f'irst 9 fourth) and group sex composition (all male 7 male 
majority, equal sex, female majority, all female) while the 
w~thin-subjects independent variable consisted of power 
position (low power (1), moderate p6wer (2), hig~ power 
(4)). The dependent variabl~ was cooperative behavior as 
measured by the number of initiated and accepted collabora-
tive negotiations. The summary,of this analysis of variance 
and the cell means are presented in Tables I and II, respec-
tively. The results will b~ discussed in terms of_the 
hypotheses they tested. Each hypothesis wa~ tested for sig-
nificance at the .05 level of probability. 
Hypothesis 1: First gr*ders will demonstrate signifi-
cantly more cooperative behavior when engaged ina mixed-
motive game than fourth graders. This hypothesis predicted 
a main effect for grade with first graders being more cooper-
ative than fourth graders. As Table I indicates this main 
effect was found (F = 5.19, df = 1/30, E.< .05) and as 
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TABLE I 
SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON NUMBER 
OF COLLABORATIVE NEGOTIATIONS 
Degrees. 
of Mean 
Source Freedom Square 
Grade 1 16.14 
Sex Composition 4 13.27 
Grade x Sex Composition 4 26.19 
Error (betw~en) 30 3.11 
Power Position 2 1..82 
Power Position x Grade 2 .83 
Power Position x Sex Composition 8 J.02 









x Grade 8 1. 82 1.16 
Error (within) 60 
*p < a05 
**p < a01 




COLLABORATIVE NEGOTIATION MEANS FOR 
VARIOUS TREATMENT CONDITIONS 
Power Positions 
Low ( 1 ) Moderate ( 2 ) 
Equal Sex 4.50 5.1J 
Male Majority,_ 4.25 5.00 
Female Majority> 2.75 J.6J 
All Male 5.25 5. J8 
All Female 7-50 8.00 
Equal Sex J.OO J.88 
Male Majority 6.50 5.50 
Female Majority 5-75 4.88 
All Male J.OO J.6J 













Table II shows the means were in the predicted direction. 
First graders were significantly more cooperative (X= 5. 20) 
than fourth graders (X= 4. 48) and, thus, the first hypothesis 
w·as supported. 
Hypothesis 2: Both the All Female (AF) and Female 
Majority (FM) sex composition groups will demonstrate sig-
nificantly more cooperative behavior than the Equal Sex 
(ES), All Hale (AH), or Male Majority (MM) sex composition 
groups. This hypothesis predicted a main effect for group 
sex composition which, as Table I shows, was found (!_= 4.27, 
df = 4/30, E..= <.0.1). However, as an inspection of Table III 
shows, the means of the five sex composition groups did not 
conform to the order predicted by Hypothesis 2. Although 
subjects in the all female groups were significantly more 
cooperative than subjects in the equal sex and the all male 
groups, they were not significantly more cooperative than 
the subjects in the male majority groups. Furthermore, sub-
jects in the female majority groups were not significantly 
more cooperative than subjects in the equal sex, male 
majority~ or all male groups. Hypothesis 2 was not 
supported. 
Hypothesis 3: The players holding the high power posi-
tion (4) will demonstrate fewer cooperative behaviors than 
players holding either the moderate (2) or low (1) power 
positions. This hypothesis predicted a main effect for 
power. As Table I indicates, this main effect was not found 
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TABLE III 
COLLABORATIVE NEGOTIATION MEANS FOR THE GROUP SEX 
COMPOSITION TREATMENT CONDITIONS 
:; l Group.Sex Composition Conditions 
Equal Male Female All All 
Sex Majority Majority Male Female 
Collaborative 
Negotiation 4.,50b 4 ·~91ab 4.22b 4.45b 6.08a 
Means 
NOTE: Means having_different letter subscripts differ sig-
nificantlyJrom each other at the .05 level of 
signifi9ance (Newman-Keuls Test). 
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(!_= 1.16~. df = 2/60, .E.> .10) and, thus, this hypothesis was 
not supported .. 
Hypothesis 4: High power (4) will decrease cooperative 
behavior amongst fourth graders to a greater degree than it 
will decrease cooperative behavior s.man_.g;st first graders. 
This hypothesis predicted a grade by power interaction which~ 
as Table I shows, was not found (!_ = 0. 53, df = 2/60 ~ p > .10) ~ 
This hypothesis was not supported. 
Although not predicted 9 two other interactions were 
found, one of which was a grade by group sex composition 
interaction (!_ = 8. 42, df = 4/JO, .E..< • 01). The means of this 
interaction are presented in Table IV and plotted in Figure 
1 o A simple main effects analysis of.: .. -Varianc e performed on 
these means and summarized in Table V demonstrated that for 
all male and all female groups, first graders were signifi-
cantly more cooperative than fourth graders, but that for 
mixed sex groups (female majority, male m~jority, equal sex) 
no significant differences were found. In carrying out the 
simple main effects analy~is, the alpha value, .05, was 
reapportioned amongst the five tests for grade differences 
within group sex composition conditions (i.e., the .01 level 
was used for each test) so that significant differences 
resulting from any of these tests would be significant at 
the .05 level. Similarly,. the alpha value, .05 9 was 
reapportioned amongst the two tests for group sex composition 
differences within grades (i.e., the .025 level was used for 




COLLABORATIVE NEGOTIATION MEANS FOR GRADE BY 
GROUP SEX .COMPOSITION INTERACTION 
Group Sex Composition Conditions 
Equal Mate Female All 
Sex Majority Majority Male 
5.04 4.JJ 3&41 5o 50 













GRADE 1 GRADE 4 
EQUAL SEX A 6 
MALE MAJORITY • • 
FEr~ALE MAJORITY c c 
ALL MALE • • 
ALL FEMALE 0 0 
Figure 1~ Mean Number of Collaborative Negotiations 




SUMMARY OF SIMPLE MAIN EFFECTS ANALYSIS FOR GRADE 
BY GROUP SEX COMPOSITION INTERACTION 
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Source df MF F 
Grade Within: 
Equal Sex 1 7.04 2.26 
Male Majority 1 8.17 2~63 
Female Majority 1 15~84 .5~09 
All Male 1 24~00 7.72* 
All Female 1 66~67 21.44* 
Group Sex Composition Within: 
Grade 1 4 31.57 10.15* 
Grade 4 4 8.02 
Error 30 
NOTE: The alpha value, .05, was apportioned among the five 
grade and two group sex composition comparisons. 
For the grade levels to be significant at the .05 
level, the F value had to meet the table value at 
.05/5 = .01 level. For the group sex composition 
conditions to be significant at the ~05 level, the F 
value had to meet the table value at .05/2 ~ .025 
level. 
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these tests would be significant at the .05 level (Kirk, 
1968). To compare the group sex composition means at the 
first grade level a Newman-Keuls analysis was done and is 
presented in Table VI. The most impor'tant implication of 
these results is that Hypothesis 1, that first graders will 
demonstrate significantly more cooperative behavior than 
fourth graders, is true only for homogeneou1:5 sex groups. It 
is not true for mixed sex groups. Apparently developmental 
trends are observable only with:f_n the "pure" environment of 
homogeneous sex groups. 
The second interaction was found betweep group sex 
composition and power (.!::_ = 1. 9 3, df = 8/60 9 .E.< • 10). The 
means of~this interaction are presented in Table VII and 
plotted in Figure 2. A simple main effects analysis of 
variance performed on these means and summarized in Table 
VIII showed that a simple main effect which reached the .10 
probability level existed for grorlp sex composition within 
the high ppwer position (4). In carrying out the simple 
main effects analysis th~ alpha value, .10, was reapportioned 
amongst the first five tests for power position differences 
within group sex composition conditions (i.e., the .02 level 
J 
was used for each test) so that differences resulting from 
any_of these tests would reach the .10 level of probability& 
Similarly the alpha value, .10, was reapportioned amongst 
the three tests for group sex compositiol} differences within 
power positions (i.e., the e03 level w~s used for each test) 







NEWMAN-KEULS COMPARISON OF GROUP SEX COMPOSITION 
MEANS FOR FIRST GRADERS 
Group ·Sex Composition Conditions 
Male Female All All 
Majority Majority Male Female 
4&J3bc 3. 41,c 5.50b 7-75 
~~'-· a 
Means having different letter subscripts differ from 
each other at the .05 level. 
TABLE VII 
COLLABORATIVE NEGOTIATION MEANS FOR GROUP SEX 
COMPOSITION BY POWER POSITION INTERACTION 
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Group Sex Composition Cond:!-tions 
Equal Male Female All All 
Sex Majority Majority Male Female 
Low· Power 
( 1 ) 3.75 50 38 4.25 4~13 5.50 
Moderate Power 
( 2 ) 4o50 5.25 4.25 4.50 6.00 
High Power 



























Figure 2. Mean Number of Collaborative Negotiations as 




SUMMARY OF SIMPLE MAIN EFFECTS ANALYSIS FOR POWER POSITION 









Group Sex Composition Within: 
Low Power (1) 
Moderate Power (2) 
































*p < .10, non-significant by the tested .05 criterion. 
NOTE: The .10 alpha level was apportioned among the five 
power position comparisons and the three sex composi-
tion comparisons. For the power position comparisons 
to be significant at the .10 level, the F value had 
to meet the table value at the . 10/5 = • 02 level. For 
the group sex composition comparisons to be signifi-
cant at the .10 level, the F value had to meet the 
table value at the .10/3 = .OJ level. 
also reach the .10 level of probability (Kirk, 1968). A 
Newman-Keuls analysis of the differences between group sex 
composition means within the high power position, which is 
summarized in Table IX, showed that when holding the high 
power position subjects in all female groups cooperated sig-
nificantly more than subjects in the male majority or female 
majority groups. However, subjects in the all female groups 
did not cooperate significantly more than subjects in the 
all male or equal sex groups. Since the group sex composi-
tion by power position interaction did not meet the 
designated o05,probability level necessary for significance 1 
further attempts to interpret this interaction were not 
1 deemed necessary. 
.£. 
1Although data on payoff demand was collected, it was 
not included in this dissertation because it was believed 
that collaborative negotiations were a better operational 







NEWMAN-KEULSCOMPARISON OF GROUP SEX COMPOSITION 
MEANS FOR HIGH POWER POSITION (4) 
Group -Sex Composition Conditions 
Male Female All All 
Majority Majority Male Female 
4 .• 1Jb 4.14b 4.75ab 6.75 a 
Means. having different letter subscripts differ from 
each other at the .05 level. 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
The primary __ (;lim of this study was to assess some of the 
factors which might influence the development of cooperative 
behavior in young children. Since no developmental theory 
on cooperation exists, it was necessary to extrapolate 
assumptions about thi$ behavior from other developmental 
theories and the limited number of research studies in this 
areao Explanations of cognitiVe theorists such as Piage"t 
(1932) and Kohlberg (196Ja, 196Jb) were integrated with 
those of.~ocial-learning theorists (Bandura and Walters, 
1963) and fi~dings of experimental game research (Kag~n 
et alo~ 1971, 1972a, 1972b; Madsen et al., 1967, 1970, 1971; 
Shears and Behrens, 1968, 1969; Tedeschi et al., 1969a, 
1969b; Vinacke and Gullickson, 1964) to predict the outcomes 
of this study. The following discussion ofithe m~jor find-
ings of the present investigation will begin with the first 
hypothesis and proceed through the remaining hyfilotheses in 
the order in which they were introduced in Chapter I and 
their results repor~ed in Chapter IV. 
The first hypothesis predicted that with age coopera-
tion would decrease, more specifically, that the first 
graders would demonstrate significant~y more cooperative 
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behavi~r than the fourth graders. This pr~diction was con-
firmed indicating that the findings of this study with 
regards to the effect of age on cooperative behavior was 
consistent wi~h all of the previous research utilizing the 
negotiable, essential games (Shears and Behrens, 196~, 1969; 
Vinacke and Gullickson, 1964), with most of the previous 
research utilizing the dyadic, forced choice games (Kagan ,, 
and Madsen, 1971, 1972b, and Madsen, 1971), but in conflict 
j 
with most of the previous observational studies (Alvy, 1968; 
Azrin and Lindsley, 1956; Baldwin, 1955; Fry, 1967; Graves, 
1937; Meister, 1956). 
The conflict between this study's finding that coopera-
tion decreases with age and the finding of observational 
studies that cooperation increases with age may be explained 
in terms of the demand charact~ristics of gamess It may be 
that cooperati-on increases with age in ordinary social 
interactions and decreases with age only in game situations. 
Children learn that games are played to be won and the older 
the ch~ld gets the better he learns this. 
An attempt was made to reduce the demand characteris-
tics of the present game situation by making no reference to 
any competitive aspect of the game and playing down any 
motive to beat the other players. However, this may not 
have been enough to eliminate such demands or cues. The 
simple fact that a gaming device was used may have been suf-
ficient to cause subjects to believe that they were suppose 
to compete to win. Vi~acke (1969) has made a similar 
observation with respect to experimental games: 
Many investigators seek to reduce such effects 
(demand characteristics) by carefully avoiding 
references to Vcompetition', 'game', etc., in 
their instructions. It is difficult to say, at 
this point, whether this device actually elimi-
nates the implied cues (p. J10). 
If it is indeed true that, in general, cooperation 
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increases with age and that it only decreases in game situ-
ations, it may be argued that the results of this study 
(and all studies employing games) are trivial and that one 
should not be alarmed by their results (i.e., the decrease 
in cooperative~ehavior with age). However, this is not 
necessarily so. It appears that the game playing set is so 
strong in our culture that activities (e.g., Sticks and 
Chips) not formally introduced as competitive games, are 
defined as such by children. The evidence from this study 
that efforts to minimize competitive cues was not sufficient 
to alter this learned response for the fourth graders sug-
gests that competitive motives are firmly implanted in 
youngstersv minds at an early age. Such a finding lends 
support to the notion that the socializatien process in our 
society has "a self-aggrandizing [competitive] flavor" 
(Ausubel and Sullivan, 1970, Po 341). Furthermore, the 
popularity of Eric Berne's book, Games People Play (1964), 
suggests that in our culture much, if not most, social 
interaction is defined in terms of games that are played 
to be won at any cost" 
This finding lends support to th~ concepts and notions 
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put forth by both the cognitive-theorists, Piaget and 
Kohlberg, and the social-learning theorists as they are pre-
sented in the theoretical section of Chapter I of this 
dissertation~ Although children. become cognitively capable 
of cooperative interactions around the beginning of the 
middle childhood years, or ages 6 and 7 (Kay, 1968; Piaget, 
1932), they also become vulnerable to being influenced by 
the peer and adult models in their environment (Bandura and 
Walters, 1963) since it is at this age that approval becomes 
especially important (Kohlberg, 1963a, 1963b). Thus, a 
decrease in cooperation with age, particularly in a game 
setting, is understandable if we accept the premise that 
competitiveness is modeled and rewarded more than coopera-
tive behavior in our society (Wrightsman, 1972). Erikson 
(1963) would suggest that the school is the field in which 
children learn to compare themselves to others and to 
competeo It then seems reasonable to excpect that as long 
as we su~ject malleable children to competitive models and 
practices in our schools (such as teaching methods as old- V 
fashioned as the "spelling bee" or as modern as the Scien-
tific Research Associates' reading laboratories for ability 
grouping), we can predict that children will become less 
cooperative and more competitive with age and experiences. 
It would be interesting to carry out a study similar to the 
present one in a school which had~ystematically incorporated 
Havighurst's (1972) tenets emphasizing cooperative rather 
than competitive reactions~ In such a restructured 
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educational milieu in which the primary-objectives would 
center around cooperativ~ interdependence, one might ex:pect 
a continuation and perhaps an increase in cooperative behav-
ior with age,. 
The second hypothesis of this study predicted a main 
effect for group sex composition such that the all female 
and female majority groups would demonstrate significantly 
more cooperative behavior than equal sex, all males, or male 
majority sex composition groups. Though differences were 
found, they were not in the precise order predicted in the 
hypothesis. Therefore, hypothesis two was not supported. 
As previosuly explained in Chapter I, the rationale for this 
hypothesis was based on the one adult study which looked at 
the effects of group sex composition on coalition formation 
strategies (Bond and Vinacke, 1961) and sex differences 
findings. Since the female composition of the tri~ds in the 
Bond and Vinacke study increased the accommodativeness of 
the groups' strategies, and because a significant_:p.umber of 
previous experimental game studies with children have found 
that females tend to play more cooperatively than males in 
these situations (Kagan and Madsen, 197~b; Maccoby .. and 
Jacklin, 1974; McKee and Leader, 1955; Sampson and Kardush, 
'!: 
1~65; Shears and Behrens, 1969; Spiro, 1965; Tedeschi, 
Hiester, and Gahagan, 1969; Vinacke and Gullickson, 1964), 
it was predicted that those groups containing the m~s{ 




Although the seco~d hypothesis was not supported, it 
appears that the rationale behind it may have been. A look 
at the means for each group (see Tab~e III) clearly indi-
cates th4t the alJ_ female sex composition groups were the: 
most cooperative. It seems that the presence of a male, or 
males~ in a group greatly reduces the amount of cooperative 
behavior ellicited~ Such a reduction in cooperativeness is 
dramatically observed when one compares the mean of the all 
female groups (X= 6. 01) with the means of all the other 
groups which range from 4.91 down to 4.22. However, this 
effect must be somewhat· qualified by makir;1g note of ;the fact 
that the mean of,~he all~female group~ was only statisti-
cally significantly greater than the equal s:ex, all male, 
and female majority groups' means~ but not the mean Qf the 
male majority_groups (see Table III). 
This curious finding that females are more affected by 
the introduction of a male in their midst than males are by 
the presence of a female (compare the difference of 1.79 
\ 
between the all female and female majority group means and 
f 
the difference of .46 between the all male and male majority~ 
grqup means from Table III) can possibly be explained by 
reference to social-lear~ing theory and the classic modeling 
study by pandura, Ross~ and Ross (196J). In this study of 
status envy~ social power~ and ,secondary.,reinforqement, 
these researchers discovered that the sex of the model 
affected imitation. They found that females were much more 
likely to imitate an opposite-sex model than males. That is, 
75 
both boys and girls were highly responsive to male models, 
but males displayed marked reluctance to imitate female 
modelf?. Bandura, Ross, and Ross (1963) suggested that their 
findings: 
probably reflect both the differential cul-
tural tolerance for cross-sex behavior displayed 
by males and females, and the privileged status 
and relatively greater positive reinforcement of 
masculine role in our socie,.ty (p. 5JJ)~ 
A concrete example of this is reflected in the fact that 
most people find it more acceptable for a girl to be 
11 tomboyish 11 and climb trees than a boy ,to be 11 sissyish" and 
play with dolls~ Genera~izing the findings of this ~~udy 
to the fi11:,dings related to hypothesis two of t]Jle present 
investigation would suggest that the precipitous drop in 
cooperative behavior in the groups composed of one or .more. 
males is due to the more powerful modeling influence of a 
male peer on a group's behavior than a female peer on a 
groupVs behavior~ That is, a male's presence in a female 
majority group dramatically .surpressed their willingness to 
cooperate while the presence of a female in a male majority 
group only slightly elevated their cooperativeness. Thus, 
it could be argued that if we wished to 5oster more coopera-
tiveness amongst our children and in our society at large, 
more prestige needs to be afforded the feminine role and the 
stereotypic behaviors and characteristics associated with it. 
Another recommendation that might be made is the male 
socialization process become more like the female socializa-
tion processo Or as Sandra Bern and her associates (1975) at 
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Stanford University are currently proposing, it might be 
recommended that the socialization process for both males 
and females follow more of an "androgynous" model than the 
traditional adherence to rigid sex role standards. Such 
changes might already be underway in some segments of our 
culture, notably people that have allied themselves to 
female and male liberation views which emphasize the freedom 
o~ people to be not only strong, but also weak 9 and not only 
competitive, but also cooperative (Farrell, 1975). 
A finding emerged in the present study which, though 
not predicted resulted in a statistically significant 
interaction which deserves special attention at this point 
in the discussion• This interaction was the grade (age) by 
group sex composition interaction and indicates that cooper-
ation decreased with age only within the all female and the 
all male sex composition groups (see Table IV, Figure 1). 
Indeed female majority and male majority groups were actually 
more cooperative at grade four than at grade one. Three 
earlier studies had reported an age by sex interaction but 
they had only looked at differences between same-sex pairs 
or triads and had ignored the study of mixed-sex pairs or 
groups (Sampson and Kardush, 1965; Shears and Behrens, 1969; 
Vinacke and Gullickson 9 1964). Furthermore, since no pre-
vious studies had examined this group sex composition vari-
able within children's groups in the manner of the present 
study and only one adult study had (Bond and Vinacke, 1961), 
there was little empirical basis for such a prediction in 
this study. 
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Two interpretations of this significant grade by group 
sex composition interaction seem worthy of discussion. The 
first is the more conservative of the two, the less specula-
tive, and the less interesting interpretation, but certainly 
merits the following- considerations. It is evident that 
although the majority of experimental game studies which 
have looked at the relationship between age and cooperation 
have found a negative relationship (Kagan and Madsen, 1971, 
1972b; Madsen 1 1971; McClintock and Nuttin, 1969; McKee and 
Leader 1 1955.; Sampson and Kardush 1 1965; Shears and Behrens, 
1969; Vinacke and Gullickson 1 1964), this study only found a 
negative relationship within the all female and all male 
groups. No relationship was found in the mixed sex groups 
(see Figure 1). An explanation which might be made of these 
results is that since children in the middle childhood years 
do not normally choose to interact in mixed-sex groups, 
when a mixed-sex situation is imposed, experimentally, 
normal spontaneous interaction is suppressed~ With the 
suppression of spontaneous behavior the age trends are 
eliminated. Some support for this interpretation comes from 
informal observation made during this experiment that seemed 
to indicate that subjects were more passive, defensive, and/ 
or aggressive in mixed~sex conditions~ Further support 
comes from the ''age profiles" which David Elkind ( 1971) 
charact.erizes in his book, A Sympathetic Understanding of 
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the Child; Six to Sixteen. In his description of the aver-
age six-year-old~ he states that "while boys and girls 
occasionally play together at this age, the movement towards 
liked sexed friends has already begun" (p_. 67) .. In his 
characterization of the average nine-year-old, Elkind makes 
these comments: 
The close friendships with peers begun at age eight 
are continued and strengthened at age nine. Such 
friendships are strictly between youngsters of the 
same sex, and there is much overt verbal hostility 
between boys and girls (p. 80). 
From observations like these about children's preferences 
for same-sexed affiliations~ it is not too surprising that 
socialization and cultural age trends--from cooperation to 
competition=~came out in the same-sex groups of this study 
while they do not appear in the mixed-sex groups. 
The second interpretation which could be rendered for 
this grade by group sex composition interaction would 
explain this dramatic decrease of cooperation within the 
same-sex groups in quite an opposite fashion. This int.er-
pretation suggests that somewhere between the first and 
fourth grades children's pref~rences fdr same-sex friends 
and affiliations changes to heterosexual preferences~ That 
is~ in the first grade (ages 6 and 7) children prefer to 
associate and be grouped with members of the same sex, as 
in the all female and all male groups of this study and this 
results in the elevation in cooperative responses in such 
situations (see Table IV, Figure 1)s However, as they grow 
older and become more and more socialized as to their 
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appropri'ate sex-role behavior, they learn to seek the at ten-
. • I 
tion and approval of members of the opposite sex. Little 
boys learn that they must behave "gallantly" in the pres~nce 
of females while little girls learn that they must behave 
"passively and demurely" around males. Thus, by ages nine 
and ten (fourth grade) the opposite sex has started to 
become an object of attraction, blunting efforts to offend 
or compete and enhancing efforts to please and cooperate. 
As Elkind (1971) notes in his age profiles, by age nine 
there is "an increased awareness of sex and sex appropriate 
behaviors" (p. 78) and by age ten, "there appears a marked 
concern amongst children about their bodies and about sexual 
·activity though it is much less noticeable among boys than 
girls" (p. 82). 
Such a growing interest in heteros~xual activities and 
relationships, plus a possible surge of rivalry among members 
of the same sex for the attention from members of tqe 
opposite sex could account for the opposite trends of the 
homogeneous and heterogeneous sex groupings between first 
and fourth grade which is so strikin~ly depicted in Figure 1. 
(Note also the major drops in amount of cooperativ~ness 
in the all female (X=3.33) and the all male (X=2.04) 
groups shown in Table IV.) As can be seen in Figure 1, by 
fourth grade cooperation is greater within the female 
majority, male majority groups. Furthermore, this same 
graphic representation of the grade·by group sex composition 
trend suggests that the other mixed-sex grouping, the equal 
Bo 
sex treatment, seems to have operated much like two separate, 
same-sex groups, and hence, the amount of their coopera-
tiveness decreased somewhat, but much less dramatically than 
the all female and all male treatment groups. Again, 
Elkind's age profiles lend support to the same-sex rivalry 
' 
interpretation when he explains .tqat sex differences in 
friendship patterns begin to emerge around age ten. He 
describes boys at this age as "beginning to move in loosely 
organized groups with a lot of switching around" and girls 
as forming more intense friendships in smaller groups, but 
at the same time~ having more "serious 'falling outs', 
being mad 9 not playing~ or speaking to one another'' (p. 8J). 
Though such a psychodynamic interpretation is highly 
speculative and certainly requires further empirical veri-
fication, the sex-typing trend.which is implied in this 
finding warrants a bit more conjecture. It might be hypoth-
esized that if this group sex composition var~able were 
examined at older ages (junior and senior high grade groups), 
this age by sex affiliation preference would become stronger. 
That is 9 the range between the heterogeneous sex groups 
(female majority and male majority) and the homogeneous sex 
groups (all female, all male, and equal sex) as is illus-
trated in Figure 1 would become wider and in the opposite, 
but just as strong a direction as that of the first graders. 
Thus~ it may be that the ninth and tenth years are the 
critical years for the crossing over of certain sex-role 
identification behaviors in this culture 0 
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The third hypothesis of this study predicted a main 
effect for power; that is, that players holding the high 
power position would demonstrate fewer cooperative behaviors 
than players holding either the moderate or low power posi-
tions. This hypothesis was not confirmed. Contrary to the 
findings of the few previous studies which utilized a simi-
lar version of the negotiable 9 essential game, Sticks and 
Chips (Shears and Behrens, 1968, 1969), high power was not 
found to decrease cooperative behavior. If anything, the 
significant power by group sex composition interaction sug-
gests that cooperation increases with power. (See Figure 2 
and Tables VII~ VIII~ and IX). This second unpredicted 
interaction demonstrated that high power players were more 
cooperative than moderate power players and that moderate 
power players were more cooperative than low power players 
in the same-sex groups, but not the mixed-sex groups. If 
it is assumed that trends are obliterated in mixed-sex 
groups due to the suppression of spontaneous behavior in 
such groupings 9 then it can be concluded that high power 
increases cooperation~ The contradiction in the conclusions 
of the Shears and Behrens' study and the present study is 
probably due to the fact that the operational definitions of 
the two studies were different. Shears and Behrens opera-
tionally defined cooperation in terms of equal (most cooper-
ative), equitable, or exploitative (least cooperative) 
payoff demands while this study defined cooperation in terms 
of initiated and accepted offers to join together~ 
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Depending on how one defines cooperative behavior it can be 
concluded that cooperation either increases or decreases 
with powero A similar state of affairs appears to exist in 
the real world~ For example, the United States, a powerful 
country 1 has initiated and belongs to more alliances than 
Norway, a weak country, thus it could be concluded that the 
United States is more cooperative than Norway. On the other 
hand if the United States and Norway teamed up to conquer 
the U.SoS.R.J the United States would demand and probably 
receive more of the spoils of war than Norway. It could 
then be concluded that the United States is less cooperative 
than Norway. Which operational definition of cooperation is 
most appropriate is debatable. It seems questionableJ 
however 1 whether an equitable division of winnings should be 
defined as noncooperative behavior. 
A criticism which can be made of both the Shears and 
Behrens' studies and the' present study is the within subjects 
nature of their experimental designs with respect to power. 
Since this design had subjects rotate power positions it 
seems likely that this design increased the cooperative 
behavior 9 especially when cooperation was defined in terms 
of payoff demand. The fact that power rotated from round 
to round may have induced an attitude of "I'll scratch your 
back (when I'm high power) if you'll scratch mine (when 
you:' re high power)." If subjects had kept their power posi-
tions through the eight rounds of the game 9 .the high power 
individuals might have been much less ready to cooperate~ 
BJ 
The fourth and final hypothesis tested in this study 
had again to do with the power variable. This hypothesis 
predicted that the high power position would decrease coop-
erative behavior amongst fourth graders to a greater degree 
than it would amongst first graders~ thus predicting an 
interaction effect for high power by grade (age). As 
stated previously~ the rationale for such a hypothesis was 
based on Piaget's notions (Kay 1 1968 9 Piaget, 1932) of' 
changes in cognitive abilities, as well as changes in con-
cerns about fairness and equity, with age, and the findings 
of the few previous children's studies dealing with these 
two variables (Shears and Behrens, 1969; Vinacke and 
Gullickson, 1964). Contrary to these findings, a power by 
grade interaction was not found and the fourth hypothesis 
had to be rejected. Fourth graders (nine- and ten-year-olds) 
were no more effected by power variations, in particular the 
high power position~ than first graders (six- and seven-
year~olds)o The subjects in this study did not appear to 
become more cognizant or sophisticated in the use of their 
high power position to demand more equitable payoff settle-
ments as a means of increasing their own gains like the sub-
jects in a previous study did. As a matter of fact 9 as the 
discussion of the findings for hypothesis three implied, if 
anything the high power status increased their cooperative-
ness an~ willingness to negotiate for equal payoffs regard-
less of age. 
Once more this contradictory finding is probably best 
accounted for by the fact that a different measuring cri-
terion was employed in this study than that of previous 
studies~-collaborative negotiations versus payoff demand 
(Shears and Behrens, 1969)s 
\ 
Since the Shears and Behrens' 
definition of cooperation defines equitable behavior on the 
part of the high power individual as noncooperative behavior, 
an understanding of equity would seem to decrease the 
cooperative behavior of the high power individuals Since an 
understanding of equity increases with age and cognitive 
development~ ~igh power players should become increasingly 
more equitable and less cooperative with age. This probably 
explains the age by power interaction found by Shears and 
Behrens (1969). Since an understanding of equity has 
nothing to do with cooperative behavior as operationally 
defined in this study, an interaction between age and sex 
should not have been found and was not. 
Summary and Implications 
The present study attempted to assess some of the 
developmental antecedents and conditions influencing cooper-
ative behavior~ Cooperative behavior was defined as a group-
oriented activity in which the individual collaborates with 
another or others to attain some common goal (Ausubel and 
Sullivan 1 1970)~ More specifically, cooperation was defined 
as the number of collaborative negotiations initiated and 
accepted by a player in a mixed-motive game situation. 
Unlike most of the previous studies in this area of 
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developmental psychology, cooperation was ~easured independ-
ent of competition since both kinds of behavior could have 
L 
been exhibited by the same individual in the experimental 
situation. .Such an independent measure o~ cooperation 
! 
added strength to the design of this experjiment and allowed 
for the collection of valuable information unobtainable 
through other measurements and procedures such as the more 
popular game techniques which included the Prisoner's 
Dilemma 7 Cooperation Board, and Circle Matrix technique~ 
Forty boys and girls~ twenty first graders and twenty 
fourth graders~ were systematically grouped into five dif-
ferent same and mixed-sex groups to ~ngage in a negotiable, 
essential 7 mixed-motive game. This game, Sticks and Chips, 
involved four children (a tetrad) who engaged in eight 
rounds of play in which their power for each round was sys-
tematically varied by rotating sticks of different lengths 
which they were instructed to "join together" to make the 
longest stick possible. For each round 7 the players who 
combined their stick to make the longest stick were awarded 
t·wenty chips which they then divided amongst themselves~ 
It was found that the first graders (six- and seven-
year-olds) demonstrated significantly more cooperative 
behavior than the fourth graders (nine- and ten-year-olds) 
in this experimental game. This finding supports the age 
trends for cooperative behavior found in a number of pre-
vious studies~ particularly those employing game techniques0 
Such a finding suggests that cooperation decreases with agee 
The implications of this finding may be of great social 
i~portancee The wider implications suggest that our 
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society and culture deemphasize the significance of coopera-
tive attitudes 9 endeavors 9 and values and in so doing do not 
provide the conditions and atmospheres necessary to foster 
a cooperative spirit in our young. It might indicate that 
we need to revise the objectives and practices, particularly 
1n our schools where most of this kind of social learning 
takes place, to ones which enhance and facilitate such 
learninge It should be kept in mind, however 9 that these 
results may be specific to game situations~ It could be 
argued that most findings using contrived laboratory games 
are not generalizable to the real world, and in this case, 
ordinary social behavior. 
Another major finding of the present investigation of 
cooperative behavior in young children was that the sex 
composition of children's groups affected their degree of 
cooperativeness. Though the results did not conform 
exactly to the hypothesis, the underlying rationale for the 
hypothesis was supported. It was found that children's 
willingness to cooperate is dependent upon the sexual makeup 
of the group they are a member of. Subjects in the first 
grade all female group were significantly more cooperative 
than subjects in any of the other groupso In addition, a 
significant grade (age) by group sex composition interaction 
was f'ound in this study~ Since it was the first time any 
investigation of the group se~ composition variable was made 
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with children~ this finding was considered the most inter-
esting one of the study and the most relevant to this area 
of developmental research. 
This grade by group sex composition interaction showed 
that children in the first grade are much more copperative 
in same~sex 1 or homogeneous sex groupings than they are in 
mixed or heterogeneous sex groups~ and that of the various 
sex groupings~ the all female group was significantly more 
cooperative than any of the other first grade sex groups~ 
This interaction also illustrated that the group sex compo~ 
sition variable affected the fourth graders in an altogether 
different mannera Though the degree of variability in 
response to this treatment was much smaller for the fourth 
graders than it was for the first graders 9 the opposite 
effect was indicated. That is 9 the fourth graders responded 
more cooperatively in the mixed or heterogeneous sex 
groupings than the same~sex groups 9 which demonstrated the 
least amount of cooperativeness. The implications of such 
a finding are indeed interesting and certainly warrant fur-
ther scientific exploration. With no previous empirical 
data on the subject of childrenis behavior and reactions to 
different sex composed social groups~ any interpretation of 
this finding is speculative at best. However 9 it might be 
inferred from such an age trend that children's preferences 
for affiliation with same and opposite sex peers changes 
during the middle childhood years from that of a preference 
for like~sex to opposite~sex associateso Some support for 
such an empirical finding has come from informal observa-
tions and writings by developmental psychologists (Cohen, 
1976; Elkind, 1971; Havighurst, 1972; Minuchin, 1965; 
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Mussen, Conger, and Kagan, 1974). The psychodynamic inter-
pretation of such a finding would suggest that as children 
become socialized in this, and perhaps other societies, boys 
and girls learn that they are supposed to be "nice" to and 
seek the approval and attention of members of the opposite 
sex; thus, as they grow older, they may behave more 
pleasantly, politely, and cooperatively towards members of 
the opposite gender. It may even be speculated that this 
kind of sex appropriate learning and socialization becomes 
stronger and would be more prevalent among older populatioltS 
than what was sampled in this study. However, such an 
interpretation and hypothesis should not be assumed withol'tt 
equal consideration of an alternative interpretation of 
these results. That is, that heterogeneous or mixed-sex 
groupings of any type during the middle childhood years may 
suppress or inhibit ordinary and spontaneous behavior, and 
in so doing, alter otherwise natural developmental trends. 
The last major finding of the present study was t~at 
power did not appear to affect the degree of cooperativeness 
on the part of the subjects under investigation. It was 
anticipated that possession of the most powerful status, the 
longest of four segments of ~ticks, would decrease ~he 
cooperativeness of the players whenever they held that posi-
tion, and that this effect would be greater for fourth 
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graders than for first graders. Thus~ a grade by high power 
interaction was predicted. However~ this interaction was 
also not found~ though another minimally significant, 
unpredicted interaction was found for group sex composition 
and power. This interaction suggested that the all female 
sex composition gr~up was the most cooperative of all the 
groups and remained so when invested with high power. The 
implications of such a contradictory and illogical finding 
is not so profound or upsetting when a closer examination 
of the dependent variable and measuring criterion is made. 
That is 9 when 1i t is considered that cooperative behavior was 
defined as number of collaboration negotiations and that the 
power was rotated an equal number of times amongst all the 
players in the game~ it is not so surprising to find that an 
altruistic and cooperative atmosphere was created which 
resulted in no power or age differences. An important 
implication of this finding is that the definitions of a 
cooperative response and t}J.e measuring techniques from all 
previous research and any future research should be care~ 
' 
fully scrutinized before any meaning is attached to or 
generalized from their findings. Unfortunately 1 this has 
not always been done in the past, thus it remains a serious 
problem in the study of this kind of human behavior (Cook 
and Stingle~ 1974; Vinacke~ 1969)~ However, it is the 
belief of this author that definitions anq measuring instru-
ments of cooperative behavior such as those which were 
employed in the present investigation are more useful and 
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meaningful than others which pervade this area of research. 
Therefore 9 further employment of such small group coalition 
game techniques can only result in relevant contributions 
to the understanding of cooperative behaviol;'. 
Once a better understanding of the development of co-
operative behavior isl acquired, then conditions which 
promote this behavior amongst people can and should be 
adoptede Such conditions might include a new emphasis on 
cooperation in our schools via revised curricula, teaching 
methods, and grading practices, and in our homes through 
cooperative models on television, in magazines and books 9 
and around the dinner table. Only then will the cultural 
differences in cooperativeness (Madsen, Kagan, Shapira 
et al., 1967-1972) begin to disappear; only then will the 
"cooperation deficiency" label (Cook and Stingle, 1974) of 
our country be dropped, and only then will our species be 
freed from the threat of destruction (Salk, 1975). 
Need for Future Research 
The findings of this study and their implications sug-
gest the need for further research to answer a number of 
questions which have been raiseds The first set of ques-
tions left open for examination center around the grade, or 
age, variablea Further research is needed to establish 
what is the "natural" developmental trend for most children 
with regards to cooperations Does it generally decrease 
with age as the present findings suggest, or is that merely 
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a function of the demand characteristics of game techniques 
frequently used to measure it? If a decrease in cooperation 
with age ·is supported by future research, what kinds of 
conditions should be provided by our socializing agencies 
and processes to promote more cooperation? 
The second set of questions this research raises has 
to do with the group sex composition variable and its effect 
on children's cooperative behavior which was under study for 
the first time in the present research. Before anything 
conclusive can be stated about the influence of such a fac-
tor on cooperation as was found in this study, much more 
research is needed to try and replicate these relationships. 
The question of whether or not children's preferences for 
same-sex friends and affiliations changes during the middle-
childhood years warrants further documentation. Further-
more, questions pertaining to whether or not homogeneous 
and heterogeneous sex groupings effect other behaviors dur-
ing these years are now also open to speculation. Is this a 
factor which mainly influences younger children (six and 
seven year olds) more than older children (nine and ten year 
olds) as was indicated by this study's findings? Or is this 
finding suggestive of further changes in sex affiliation 
preferences during adolescence? The implication that fourth 
grade (ages nine and ten) may be the critical, crossing-over 
age for such preferences needs further validation. 
The final questions which have been raised by this 
research and remain unresolved may be the most important 
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ones when it comes to future resea~ch in this area of 
developmental psychology. These are the questions of 
methodology--laboratory games versus observational 
procedures--and operational definitions of cooperation--
equitable payoff demands versus collaborative negotiations. 
This study found that variations in power did not effect 
the ~egree of cooperation elicited and this finding was 
explained in terms of the operational definition and instru-
ment employed to measure cooperation. Since this variable 
and its effect on the development of cooperation has 
received only minimal scientific attention and the few pre-
vious studies all employed different measuring criteria 
which resulted in contradictory findings, further investiga-
tion with regards to its actual effect is strongly recom-
mended. A major study which involved the comparison of the 
various popular measuring devices and procedures would make 
an invaluable contribution to this area of research and our 
understanding of the development of cooperative behaviore 
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